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Abstract
Three Essays on the Nature of Consciousness
Jonathan Brink Morgan, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018
Co-Supervisors:  Richard Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye
You and I are conscious. So are most humans and higher mammals. However, things like 
tables, chairs, rocks, and other inanimate objects are not. Though there is something it is 
like to be me, there is nothing it is like to be a table. But what is it to be conscious? What 
is this property that we have but that inanimate objects lack? This is the question my 
dissertation seeks to answer.
I begin by noting an asymmetry  in our epistemic access to qualia––roughly those 
qualities that we are immediately aware of in conscious experience. I argue that at least 
some of these qualities are spatial qualities and, moreover, spatial qualities that are not 
typically instantiated by subjects or the internal states of subjects. The moral is that, in 
general, being conscious must consist in being related to certain qualities that are not ‘in 
the heads’ of conscious subjects. Consciousness extends beyond the bounds of skin and 
skull. 
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My view is that only two theorists can adequately explain this: the intentionalist and 
the naïve realist. Roughly, the intentionalist thinks that to have a perceptual experience is 
to phenomenally represent the world as being some way, whereas the naïve realist thinks 
that to have a perceptual experience is, at least sometimes, to simply perceive the world. 
Though many hold that we must choose between these theories, I show that this is false. 
All positive naïve realist theses admit of intentionalist precisification. In this way, we 
may be both intentionalists and naïve realists.
Once we find our footing as intentionalists who embrace naïve realism, we face a 
further question: What is the place of consciousness in nature? Answering this question is 
harder  than  generally  acknowledged  since  phenomenal  representation  has  peculiar 
representational  limits.  Just  as  there  are  things  that  cannot  be  pictorially  or 
diagrammatically represented, there are things that cannot be phenomenally represented. 
One  cannot,  for  example,  phenomenally  represent  color  without  phenomenally 
representing  space.  But  extant  theories  that  ‘reduce’  phenomenal  representation  to 
naturalistic ingredients fail to respect these limits. We must, therefore, embrace a non-
reductive theory of consciousness. 
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0. HOW TO READ THIS DISSERTATION
Traditionally, dissertations in philosophy aspired to be book-like. The writer’s goal was, 
in some sense, to produce a manuscript in which each chapter built on the last so that the 
dissertation  would  incrementally  guide  the  reader  to  a  sort  of  ‘big  picture’.  I’ve  not 
written this sort of dissertation. Why? Because increasing professionalization of our field 
has  rendered  the  format  impractical––once  the  tenure  clock  starts  ticking,  we  are 
typically expected to produce a slew of articles rather than a single book. In light of this, 
I’ve opted for the so-called ‘MIT style’ dissertation: three independent essays, each of 
publishable length.
But,  practical  or  not,  I’ve still  tried to  keep some aspects  of  the tradition alive. 
Though the essays are, strictly speaking, independent of one another, they are meant to 
chart a single path. At the end of the path is a theory of consciousness that, though it goes 
unnamed in the dissertation, we might call non-reductive naïve realist intentionalism. Let 
me explain how the dissertation takes us to this view. 
0.1 Theories of Consciousness
Typically,  when  we  seek  a  theory  of  something,  we  have  some  rough  sense  of  the 
ontological category under which that thing falls. When, for example, we seek a theory of 
color,  there is  some general  sense that  color is  a property––not an individual,  not an 
event, not a state of affairs. A property. It is the sort of thing that can be instantiated or 
not, shared by numerically distinct individuals, and so on. Similarly, when philosophers 
seek a theory of intentional actions, there is often tacit agreement that actions are events 
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of a certain sort.  Actions are the sort of things that begin and end, that have duration, and 1
so on. This sort of tacit agreement is not usually a consequence of theorizing. Rather, it is 
the result of pretheoretic intuitions about the target of investigation. If this is right, then it 
seems that the following question should have a plausible, pretheoretic answer: Under 
what ontological category does consciousness fall?
Ordinary talk about consciousness strongly suggests that, like color, it is a property. 
For example, you and I are conscious. So are most humans and higher mammals. But 
things like tables, chairs, rocks, and other inanimate objects are not. As they say, there is 
something it is like to be me, or you, or an orangutan, but there is nothing it is like to be a 
table. In other words, there is a salient property that you, I, and higher mammals have, 
but that inanimate objects like chairs and rocks lack. It is the same property that you lose 
upon falling into a dreamless sleep and regain upon waking, the same property whose 
possession makes it impermissible to kick me but whose absence makes it permissible to 
kick a football. This property is consciousness (or being conscious if you like). Moreover, 
our ordinary conception suggests that consciousness is what some call a determinable 
property. Just as there are many different ways of being red, there are many different 
ways of being conscious. Something can be red by being scarlet or by being crimson or 
by  having  any  one  of  many  specific  shades  of  redness.  Redness  is  a  determinable 
property and its shades––the different, specific ways of being red––are its determinates. 
The  same  thing  holds  for  consciousness.  What  it  is  like  to  see  (or  for  that  matter 
hallucinate) an orange in sunlight is quite different than what it is like to feel a pain in 
your  lower  back.  These  are  two  different  ways  of  being  conscious,  and,  in  being 
Rescinding tacit agreement is, of course, an option if theoretical pursuits turn out unfruitful.1
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conscious  in  these  ways,  you  instantiate  different  determinates  of  the  determinable 
property consciousness. These determinates I call phenomenal properties.
I view my dissertation as trying to arrive at a view about the nature of phenomenal 
properties.  You’ll  notice,  however,  that I  haven’t adopted the ‘phenomenal properties’ 
terminology in the essays. This is because it is not the terminology used in most of the 
debates that I address and––for practical, publishing-related reasons––I need to be able to 
put myself in direct conversation with the philosophers and scientists in these debates. 
Nonetheless, everything I say admits of translation into this framework. 
0.2 Are Phenomenal Properties Relational Properties?
The first  question  I  address  in  the  dissertation  is  whether  phenomenal  properties  are 
relational properties of subjects. There are two views here: 
Relational  theories:  A  subject’s  being  conscious  consists,  at  least 
partially, in her being related to things that are wholly distinct from her. 
Non-relational  theories:  A subject’s  being  conscious  does  not  even 
partially consist in her being related to things that are wholly distinct from 
her.
In the essay Where in the World are Qualia?, I argue that some relational theory is true.
The argument––very roughly––goes as follows. Phenomenal properties seem to have 
certain  qualities  as  constituents.  These  qualities––what  some  call  qualia––are  the 2
qualities that are directly present to us in experience and that characterize what it is like 
 This is a claim that even non-relational theorists can accept. They simply give it a non-relational 2
reading. See Martine Nida-Rümelin (2011: 355).
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for us to see, hear, smell, and so on. I argue that at least some of these qualities are spatial 
qualities and, moreover, spatial qualities that are not typically instantiated by subjects or 
the internal  states of  subjects.  So,  phenomenal  properties  must  consist  in relations to 
spatial  qualities  that  are  not  (or  need  not)  be  instantiated  by  subjects  of  experience. 
Hence, some relational theory must be true.
0.3 Which Relational Theory?
The second question I address is which sort  of relational theory we ought to adopt. I 
consider two options:
Intentionalism: Being conscious is just a matter of bearing a distinctive 
intentional attitude to a content.
Naïve  realism:  Bracketing  cases  of  illusion  and  hallucination,  being 
conscious is just a matter of being acquainted with things in the external 
world.
Rather than show how we might decide between these two theories, I instead show that 
we do  not  need to  decide.  This  is  the goal  of  Intentionalism for  Naïve Realists.  My 
strategy  is  to  show  that  all  positive  naïve  realist  theses  admit  of  intentionalist 
precisifications. That is,  when we look at the positive claims that naïve realists make 
about the nature of perceptual consciousness, we can see that they may be made more 
specific in a way that accommodates intentionalism. But once we see that this is possible, 
then we can see that an intentionalist naïve realism is possible. We do not, it turns out, 
have to choose between the theories at all. 
 
 4
0.4 Can Consciousness be Reduced to Naturalistic Ingredients?
The  final  question  I  address  is  whether  phenomenal  properties  admit  of  naturalistic 
reduction. There are two options here:
Reductive  theories:  Consciousness  can  be  identified with  some set  of 
physical, functional, or computational ingredients. 
Non-reductive theories:  Consciousness cannot be identified with some 
set of physical, functional, or computational ingredients.
The intentionalist, traditionally, is thought to have an advantage in securing a reductive 
theory. Intentionality, it seems, might very well admit of naturalistic reduction––we at 
least  have  naturalistic  theories  of  intentionality  that  seem  relatively  plausible.  If 
phenomenal  properties  are  intentional  properties,  a  potential  bridge  across  the 
explanatory gap becomes available: if we can cross the gap between the physical and the 
intentional, then we may also cross the gap between the physical and the phenomenal. 
The final essay The Representational Limits of Perception makes a case for a non-
reductive theory. Say that, on intentionalism, having a phenomenal properties consists in 
phenomenally  representing  certain  qualities  as  instantiated.  I  argue  that  phenomenal 
representation,  by  its  very  nature,  has  peculiar  representational  limits.  Just  as  it  is 
impossible to pictorially represent certain qualities in isolation, it is also impossible to 
phenomenally  represent  certain  qualities  in  isolation.  For  example,  it  is  impossible––
metaphysically  impossible––for  a  subject  to  have  an  experience  that  phenomenally 
isolates color. There is no such thing as an experience ‘as of’ a red thing that is not also 
an  experience  ‘as  of’ a  spatial  thing.  The  problem  is  that  naturalistic  reductions  of 
phenomenal representation––like those of Fred Dretske (1995) and Michael Tye (1995)––
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seem to predict that the relevant qualities can be phenomenally represented in isolation. 
Since  these  are  the  most  promising  accounts  that  purport  to  reduce  phenomenal 
representation to naturalistic ingredients, I think we should reject reductive intentionalism 
in favor of non-reductive intentionalism.
0.5 Putting the Pieces Together
So, my dissertation recommends three views about consciousness: intentionalism, naïve 
realism,  and  non-reductionism.  Taken  together,  we  get––unsurprisingly––a  non-
reductive, naïve realist intentionalism:
Non-reductive  naïve  realist  intentionalism:  Consciousness  is  an 
irreducible  species  of  mental  representation,  but  this  is  consistent  with 
naïve realism.
I hope this gives you a sense of the contours of what’s to come. Again, I stress that I do 
not avail myself of the term ‘phenomenal properties’ within the dissertation itself (for 
reasons already given). But maybe you will think this a good thing. If so (and even if 
not), I invite you to read on. 
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1. WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE QUALIA?
I’m interested in two interrelated questions about qualia: 
(1) What––if anything––are qualia instantiated by? 
(2) What is it for a subject to experience a quale?
Sense datum theorists  provide an instructive example of how we might answer these 
questions. Uncomfortable with putting qualia in the material world, they locate them in 
certain mind-dependent objects i.e. sense data. On their view, experiencing a given quale 
like redness is to be explained by being directly aware of a red sense datum––and so on 
for all  qualia and experiences thereof.  So what are qualia properties of according the 
sense datum theorist? Sense data. What is it for a subject to experience a quale? It is for 
her to be directly aware of a sense datum that instantiates that quale. 
Sense datum theorists are all but gone now, their most vocal representatives (e.g. 
Frank  Jackson  1977)  having  converted  to  other  views  some  time  ago.  Still,  some 
philosophers  and  cognitive  scientists  are  uncomfortable  locating  qualia  in  the  extra-
mental world. But rather than hold that qualia are properties of peculiar items like sense 
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data, these theorists hold that they are properties of our mental states––neural states in all 
likelihood––and  our  experiencing  them  is  in  some  sense  just  a  matter  of  being 
appropriately related to these states.  Paul Coates is one of the few proponents of this 3
position who is completely clear about his view:
When I look at a clear sky in the daytime, a blue phenomenal quality fills 
my visual  field;  this  is,  in actuality,  a  phenomenal quality of my inner 
experience. In having a perceptual experience, I am in some sense…aware 
of  inner  states  of  mind that  mediate  my consciousness  of  the  sensible 
qualities of the physical objects that I perceive. (Coates 2007: 127)
This view might go by other names elsewhere, but since it locates qualia ‘within’ subjects 
of experience, I am going to call it subjectivism. More on this view in a moment. 
This  paper  is  a  call  for  subjectivists  to  join  their  sense  datum counterparts  and 
convert.  Subjectivism, if  it  ever looks plausible,  only gains this appearance when we 
focus exclusively on qualia associated with the so-called secondary qualities like color. 
But the view looks far less plausible when we turn our attention to qualia associated with 
the so-called primary qualities like shape. If we take in the full scope of subjectivism, it 
looks to be a picture of qualia––and experience more generally––that we should reject. 
My point is one that, of course, proponents of the transparency of experience have been 
urging for years: qualia ain’t in the head. However, my arguments are independent of 
theirs. In fact, they fill a previously unfilled gap in the argument from transparency. 
A brief word on qualia before we begin. I assume that, if you are reading this paper, 
you have a decent idea of what I mean when I use the term ‘qualia’. (You might use the 
This, of course, would only constitute a difference between the two theories if sense data are not 3
mental states. See Michael Huemer (2001: 152-153) for a discussion of this intermediate view. 
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term ‘phenomenal  qualities’,  ‘subjective  qualities’,  ‘sensory  qualities’,  or  ‘qualitative 
features of experience’.  I  stick with ‘qualia’ here.)  Moreover,  you are likely a realist 
about qualia––you hold that there are such things. But some philosophers pack into their 
understanding  of  ‘qualia’  that  qualia  are  somehow  essentially  ineffable,  essentially 
private, essentially this-or-that. And, relying on these inflated understandings of qualia, 
other philosophers deny that there are such things.  But I think that, once we lean out the 4
concept, it should be uncontroversial that qualia exist. As I use the term, qualia are those 
qualities  of  which  we  are  immediately  aware  in  conscious  experience  and  that 
characterize what it is like for us to see, hear, smell, feel, and so on. They are the qualities 
that generate familiar puzzles about integrating consciousness into a physical world––
puzzles like the explanatory gap, the apparent possibility of zombies, and the knowledge 
argument. Note that I am not trying to define the term ‘qualia’ at all. I am merely trying to 
draw your attention to the things I have in mind. So if qualia are essentially ineffable, 
private, or whatever, this is not a matter of definition, in my view, but rather a substantial 
philosophical claim.5
Hopefully this is enough to get us going for now. If not, how I use the term ‘qualia’ 
will become much clearer in a moment. 
1.1 Subjectivism
Open up just about any introduction to vision science and you will likely find a passage 
that reads as follows:
Most famously, Daniel Dennett (1988).4
Moreover, as question (1) suggests,  I  think it  is an open question––at least at the outset––what 5
qualia are properties of. Even though we are immediately aware of them in experience, they may 
not be qualities of our experiences. 
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People  universally  believe  that  objects  look  colored  because  they  are 
colored, just as we experience them. The sky looks blue because it is blue, 
grass looks green because it is green, and blood looks red because it is red. 
As surprising as it may seem, these beliefs are fundamentally mistaken. 
Neither objects nor lights are actually ‘colored’ in anything like the way 
we  experience  them.  Rather,  color  is  a  psychological  property  of  our 
visual  experiences  when  we  look  at  objects  and  lights,  not  a  physical 
property of those objects or lights. (Stephen Palmer, 1999: 95; emphasis 
added)  6
A careless reading of Palmer’s remarks might suggest that they are obviously wrong. For, 
on the face of it, one might take him to claim that when we experience colors, there are 
literally  mental  states  of  ours  that  possess  those colors.  But  this  is  false.  We are,  as 
speakers of English, competent with color terms and have a good sense of when to apply 
them and when to withhold application. We would not generally apply the term ‘neon 
green’ to the mental states of those experiencing neon green. 
But the careless reading is uncharitable. Palmer isn’t really talking about color at all. 
Instead, he is talking about color qualia––or, in his terms, color as we experience it.  We 7
may introduce color qualia by example. Suppose that you see a ripe tomato. As you do 
this, you will become immediately aware of a sort of color-like quality. It is a quality that 
Depending on how one interprets certain texts in the history of philosophy, this is by no means a 6
new view. Early modern philosophers, like David Hume, often claimed things to the effect that 
“colors…are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind” (1738/1911, Bk III, part I, Sect. 
1). Similarly, some 20th century philosophers, like C.J. Ducasse, held that “blue, bitter, etc., are not 
objects of experience, nor species of objects of experience, but species of experience itself” (1952: 
247). 
See David Rosenthal (1999) for a discussion about using color terms to characterize experience.7
 
 10
is immediately present to you upon seeing––or for that matter hallucinating––fire trucks, 
roses, ketchup, cherries, Sriracha, etc. But it is not typically present to you upon seeing 
school  buses,  sunflowers,  mustard,  blueberries,  garlic,  and  so  on.  For  the  sake  of 
neutrality, we may call this quality RED. We may follow suit for other color qualia, using 
‘BLUE’ to denote the color quale we typically experience upon seeing or hallucinating 
blue things, ‘YELLOW’ to denote the color quale we typically experience upon seeing or 
hallucinating yellow things, and so on. In specifying the intended referent of ‘RED’ by 
example,  we  remain  neutral  on  the  nature  of  RED.  It  is  simply  whatever  quality  is 
immediately present to one in seeing or hallucinating fire trucks, roses, and the like. So 
though this quality might be ordinary redness, it also might not be, at least for all that we 
have said so far. This means, however, that even if one is committed to saying that you 
have a mental state that possesses RED, one is not thereby committed to saying that you 
have a mental state that is literally red, for one is not yet committed to saying RED = red. 
If we read Palmer as conveying a view about color qualia, as suggested above, his 
view seems more believable. It is an instance of a familiar view, namely, the view that all 
qualia are properties instantiated by mental states of subjects––the view that I am calling 
subjectivism. To be a bit more precise about all this, according to subjectivism, when I 
experience, say, the quale RED, my experiencing it is in some sense just a matter of my 
being appropriately related to a RED mental state of mine. The ‘in some sense just a 
matter of’ is meant to provide flexibility, allowing for different formulations of the view 
that might appeal to identity or grounding. 
Subjectivism: A subject’s experiencing a quale is either identical with or 
grounded in her being appropriately related to one of her mental states that 
instantiates that quale.
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So,  it  might  be  that  my experiencing  RED is  identical  with  my being  appropriately 
related to a RED mental state of mine. Alternatively, it might be that experiencing RED is 
merely grounded in, but not identical with, being appropriately related to such a mental 
state. ‘Being appropriately related’ is a placeholder for whatever relation a subject need 
stand in to such a state in order for that state’s qualitative features to show up in her 
conscious life. It might be the relation that a subject stands in to such a state just when the 
state is  poised to feed information into the cognitive system for the direct  control  of 
thought and behavior, or it might be a sort of quasi-perceptual relation, or perhaps it is 
just a parthood relation, or perhaps it  is whatever ‘relation’ is denoted by ‘having’ in 
‘having a mental state’. The details will not matter for my purposes here.
Why accept subjectivism? Contemporary subjectivists (like Papineau 2014, 2016) 
tend to present their view as a welcome alternative to the many anti-subjectivist views of 
the  late  20th  and early  21st  century (e.g.  intentionalist  or  representationalist  theories). 
Papineau’s argument for subjectivism, I take it, is just that the salient anti-subjectivist 
alternatives are unsatisfying. I do not, however, wish to get caught up in evaluating this 
argument just yet. I mention it only to assure you that this discussion is not taking place 
in  a  vacuum.  My  concern  will  simply  be  with  the  viability  of  subjectivism  for  the 
moment. We will take a look at arguments later. 
1.2 An Asymmetry
In this section, I wish to draw your attention to a certain asymmetry  in our epistemic 
access to qualia. In the next section, I will explain how this asymmetry creates a problem 
for subjectivism.
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When we discuss qualia,  we often focus on things like pain qualia,  color qualia, 
and––more  generally––qualia  associated  with  perception  of  the  so-called  secondary 
qualities. But insofar as there are qualia associated with perceiving secondary qualities, 
there  are  qualia  associated  with  perceiving  primary  qualities  like  shape  and  spatial 
location. For in the same way that we are immediately aware of a certain quality when we 
perceive the color of a tomato, we are also immediately aware of another quality when 
we perceive its shape. Just as there are color qualia, there are shape qualia. 
I  don’t  assume  any  substantive  characterization  of  what  the  primary-secondary 
quality distinction amounts  to.  However,  it  was commonplace among those who first 
relied on the distinction to hold that at least one difference between the two categories 
consisted in the fact that “the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of 
them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; But the Ideas, produced 
in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all” (Locke, 1689 
2.8.15). On one way of reading these remarks, if ‘ideas’ are qualia, the thought is that 
qualia associated with perceiving primary qualities genuinely resemble primary qualities 
themselves, but qualia associated with perceiving secondary qualities do not resemble 
secondary  qualities  at  all.  So,  for  example,  shape  qualia  resemble  shapes,  but  color 8
qualia do not resemble colors.
Bracketing  for  a  moment  whether  you  agree  with  Locke  on  the  claim  about 
resemblance, there is an interesting question to be asked: What would make such a claim 
even seem plausible? That is, why would one even be inclined to think that (for example) 
shape qualia resemble shapes whereas color qualia do not resemble colors? 
Alternatively, if we think of ideas as states of subjects or even sense data, we might say that the 8
bearers of shape qualia resemble the bearers of shape whereas the bearers of color qualia do not 
resemble the bearers of color. 
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I think the answer has to do with the kind of impoverished epistemic access that we 
have to color qualia. The idea I have in mind, to some extent, originates in the work of 
Thomas Reid. He writes,
Everyone  knows  that  extension,  divisibility,  figure,  motion,  solidity, 
hardness, softness, and fluidity, were by Mr Locke called primary qualities 
of body; and that sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold, were called 
secondary qualities. Is there a just foundation for this distinction? Is there 
anything common to the primary which belongs not to the secondary? And 
what is it? 
I  answer,  That  there  appears  to  be  a  real  foundation  for  the 
distinction; and it is this––that our senses give us a direct and a distinct 
notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves. 
But  of  the  secondary  qualities,  our  senses  give  us  only  a  relative  and 
obscure notion…as to what they are in themselves, our senses leave us in 
the dark. (1785: 2.17)9
Now, the way I would read Reid here––or, at any rate, a plausible point that is suggested 
by Reid’s remarks––is that perception of a primary quality puts one in a position to know 
the real definition  of that quality whereas perception of a secondary quality does not. 
Think of real definitions as metaphysical analyses that tell us, in a robust sense, what 
something is.  For example, you might think that what it  is  to be a person is to be a 
rational animal. That is, the real definition of the property being a person is the property 
Reid ultimately rejects the idea that sensations of primary qualities resemble the primary qualities 9
themselves. However, it is reasonable to think that, in offering up the account he does, he is offering 
an explanation of why we would be inclined to think that a resemblance holds in the first place. 
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being a rational animal––that’s what it is to be a person. Alternatively, what it is to be 
square is to have exactly four sides of equal length and exactly four interior angles each 
of 90º––that’s  the real  definition of being square.  Reid’s idea,  then,  seems to be that 
perception of (say) shape puts one in a position to know what it is for something to be 
shaped whereas perception of color does not put one in a position to know what it is for 
something to be colored. 
It is natural, I think, to extend Reid’s remarks to what we can know about color and 
shape qualia by means of being directly aware of them––by being acquainted with them. 
For reasons I will explain in a moment, there is an epistemic asymmetry in our access to 
shape qualia  and color  qualia  (and qualia  associated with the primary and secondary 
qualities more generally).  Moreover, it seems to be this asymmetry that underlies the 10
plausibility of Locke’s resemblance thesis. 
To see why the existence of an epistemic asymmetry is plausible, focus first on the 
case of color qualia. Arguably, real definitions of color qualia are not knowable through 
acquaintance.  (The  usual  restrictions  to  ‘knowable’  apply  here––I  mean  typically 
knowable for creatures like us under normal circumstances.) To know the real definition 
of a property F is to have a bit of propositional knowledge––knowledge that what it is to 
be F is to be thus-and-such. But it is plausible that knowledge of this sort about color 
As a brief aside, I take it for granted that we are acquainted with qualia. In fact, I take a subject’s 10
being acquainted with a quale to be necessarily coextensive with that quale’s being immediately 
present to that subject.  The acquaintance relation is the converse of the immediate presentation 
relation. To that extent, it is nearly definitional, at least as I use the term, that, qualia can become 
objects of acquaintance. The means by which we are acquainted qualia I leave open to speculation. 
It may be a certain sort of phenomenal  acquaintance whereby our being acquainted with qualia 
simply consists  in  having experiences  of  a  certain  sort.  Or  it  might  be  a  kind of  introspective 
acquaintance that is independent of experience. Or it might be something else entirely. I leave this 
matter open in the text.
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qualia is not available through acquaintance with them. Consider, for example, the quale 
RED. There are substantial things that I can know about RED, at least in part, by being 
acquainted  with  it.  If,  in  addition  to  RED,  I  am  also  acquainted  with  BLUE  and 
ORANGE, I can come to know that, necessarily, RED is more similar to ORANGE than 
it is to BLUE. But if upon being acquainted with RED, I put to myself the question of 
what it is to be RED, I find myself at a loss. In at least my own case, acquaintance––even 
when  supplemented  by  my  competency  with  various  concepts  from  philosophy  and 
science––fails  me.  I  cannot  really  tell  you  anything  informative  about  what  it  is  for 
something to be RED on these grounds. Acquaintance tells me nothing of RED’s real 
definition.
To make this vivid, suppose RED’s real definition is functional: what it is to be RED 
is to possess some functional quality F. Yet, even if I possess a clear and distinct concept 
of F, introspecting RED does not put me in a position to know that what it is to be RED is 
to be F. Similar remarks hold for other properties that might provide the real definition of 
RED, like the property of having a disposition to reflect certain wavelengths of light 
across  the  visible  spectrum or  the  property  of  exhibiting  a  certain  firing  rate  in  the 
‘posterior cortical hot zone’ in the brain.  11
This sort of poverty of acquaintance is something that, quite often, contemporary 
philosophers accept. That is, they accept the claim that the real definition of RED is not 
Now, you might want to say that the reason that acquaintance does not enable us to know that RED 11
has thus-and-such real definition is that it has no real definition and we cannot know false things. In 
other words, RED is a simple property that admits of no metaphysical analysis. But, at least to me, 
it also seems that we cannot know that RED is simple (if it is) just through acquaintance either. We 
cannot, through acquaintance, even come to know that RED lacks a real definition.
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knowable  through  acquaintance.  For  example,  Michael  Tye  writes––even  if  RED  is 
ordinary redness––that, nonetheless, 
[t]he  nature  of  the  color  red  is  not  completely  known  to  us  in 
acquaintance. Acquaintance does not tell us what that nature is. To know 
the  nature  of  red,  we  need  to  know that  the  nature  is  so-and-so.  And 
knowledge  by  acquaintance  does  not  issue  in  knowledge  of  this  sort. 
(2009, 143).
Tye’s motivation for thinking this is, in part, that he takes RED to be a complex, physical 
property of objects. Yet we cannot, it seems, know this fact about RED just by being 
acquainted with it. 
It is interesting, however, that parallel claims about the nature of shape qualia are 
absent from the philosophical literature. Almost no one, to my knowledge, holds that their 
real definitions are hidden from us in acquaintance. This, I believe, is no accident. The 
parallel claims about shape qualia are extremely implausible. 
Suppose that I am looking at a Post-it note head-on. In doing so, I am presented with 
a quality––the same quality that is presented to me when I look at a floor tile or a coffee 
table from above. For the sake of neutrality, we may call this quality SQUARE. Although 
acquaintance does not reveal to me the nature of RED and other color qualia, it does 
seem to reveal to me the nature of SQUARE. That is, in some sense, the real definition of 
SQUARE is  knowable  through  being  acquainted  with  it.  Given  a  bit  of  background 
knowledge of geometry, upon being acquainted with SQUARE, I can tell what it is to be 
SQUARE: it is to have exactly four straight sides of equal length and exactly four interior 
angles, each of 90º. Given my background conceptual capacities, SQUARE’s geometric 
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nature is simply laid bare to me. Why the confidence? Because, if I am wrong about this, 
then I confess that I must be deeply confused about the subject matter of geometry. If 
geometry  doesn’t  concern  properties  like  SQUARE,  then  I  must  be  wrong––very 
wrong––about how to apply the concepts of length, equality, angle, side, and so on. For it 
seems obvious to me (just about as obvious as anything) that what it is to be SQUARE is 
to have exactly four straight sides of equal length and exactly four interior angles of 90º. 
Of  course,  I  might  be  slightly  wrong.  That  is,  I  may  have  gotten  some  of  the 
measurements of the interior angles wrong, or I might be mistaken that the sides all need 
to be of exactly the same length. However, I can tell that the real definition of SQUARE 
at least resembles the real definition of squareness itself. And, to that extent, I can tell that 
SQUARE is a sort of geometric quality. With varying degrees of precision, I can do this 
for many shape qualia. 
But again, I cannot do this for color qualia. It is this epistemic asymmetry, I believe, 
that  underlies  the  idea  that  qualia  associated  with  the  primary qualities  resemble  the 
primary qualities whereas qualia associated with the secondary qualities do not resemble 
the secondary qualities. I am not suggesting that the latter portion of this claim is true––I 
am not suggesting, for example, that color qualia do not resemble colors. Rather, I am 
suggesting  that  the  apparent  difference  in  resemblance  is  explained  by  patterns  of 
epistemic  access  that  we  have  to  qualia.  We  can  easily  come  to  know the  (at  least 
approximate) real definitions of shape qualia through acquaintance and, as it turns out, 
these real definitions resemble the real definitions of shapes. But the real definitions of 
color qualia are not knowable in this way and, to that extent, we cannot know through 
acquaintance whether color qualia resemble colors. That is what makes Locke’s claims 
about resemblance seem plausible (even if false).
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1.3 The Problem of Phenomenal Geometry
Reflection on this apparent asymmetry, however, reveals a problem for subjectivism. The 
problem is that if shape qualia have the real definitions that I claim they do––namely, 
geometric real definitions––then subjectivism is very likely false. If you want to think of 
it this way, I want to deny the consequent of a claim that David Lewis once made, namely 
that “If qualia are physical properties of our experiences, and experiences in turn are 
physical  events,  then it  is  certain  that  we seldom,  if  ever,  identify  the  qualia  of  our 
experiences”  (1995:  142).  I  claim  we  can  identify  shape  qualia  and  so  deny  the 
consequent. Since I deny the consequent, I also deny the antecedent: that shape qualia are 
properties of our experiences––or any of our mental states for that matter. 
For convenience, I reproduce my characterization of subjectivism below: 
Subjectivism: A subject’s experiencing a quale is either identical with or 
grounded in her being appropriately related to one of her mental states that 
instantiates that quale.
I invite you to bring some square item before you––for the sake of illustration, I will 
assume you have chosen a Post-it note. Place the Post-it note directly before you and take 
a good look at it. As you do this, you will experience SQUARE. If subjectivism about 
shape experience is true, then your experiencing SQUARE is just a matter of your being 
appropriately related to some mental state of yours that is itself SQUARE. So, there must 
be a mental state of yours that is, in fact, SQUARE. 
However, to repeat a point from above, SQUARE has its geometric nature revealed 
to  us  in  acquaintance.  By being  acquainted  with  it,  and  being  competent  with  basic 
geometric concepts, we can tell what it is for something to be SQUARE: it is for it to 
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have exactly four straight sides of equal length and exactly four interior angles, each of 
90º.  If this is right, however, then SQUARE is none other than ordinary squareness. 12
Yet––and here is the important point––if SQUARE is squareness, then the subjectivist is 
committed to the following: (1)  When you experience squareness,  there is  literally a 
mental state of yours that is square; and moreover, (2) your having a square mental state 
is identical with or grounds your experiencing squareness.
Both claims are implausible. Suppose first that mental states are (token) identical 
with brain states or, at any rate, states that are spatially coincident with brain states. If so, 
then, intuitively, the first claim seems wrong. The idea that there is a square thing in your 
head whenever you experience squareness is, well, bizarre. (As Fred Dretske once put it, 
“your experiences of moving squares [i.e.  brain states] aren’t moving squares” (2003: 
72).) Relatedly, the idea that being related to a square thing in your brain is identical with 
or  grounds  your  experiencing squareness  is  not  a  plausible  empirical  hypothesis.  No 
scientist seeking the neural correlates of shape qualia would claim that having a square 
brain state explains, let alone is to be identified with, one’s experiencing squareness. The 
experience of squareness is,  if  anything, correlated with some kind of global or local 
neural activity––plausibly activity in the so-called ‘posterior cortical hot zone’.  It is not 13
correlated with having a square brain state. So even if you happened to have a square 
brain state at the time you experience squareness, there is no reason to think that your 
being related to such a state is identical with or grounds your experiencing squareness. 
I’m bracketing the issue (discussed in the last section) of whether I’ve got the real definition exactly 12
right in order to simplify the presentation of this issue.
See Koch et al (2016). 13
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Now, suppose instead that mental states are not even token identical with brain states 
or, in fact, anything spatially coincident with the brains of subjects. Suppose instead that 
something like Cartesian dualism is true––mental states are token identical  with non-
spatial  states  of  some  Cartesian  mind.  So,  experiencing  SQUARE  requires  and  is 
explained by being related to a square, non-spatial mental state. Again, this is false. Since 
SQUARE is squareness, this means that you must have a non-spatial mental state that is 
square. But this is metaphysically impossible––being square constitutively requires being 
spatial. And this means that, if you are in fact a Cartesian mind, then none of your mental 
states are square, so your experience of squareness cannot be identical with or grounded 
in your being related to a square mental state of yours. Subjectivism, even when given a 
Cartesian interpretation, must be false. 
To recap, the argument is this. Subjectivism about shape experience requires that, 
when you experience SQUARE, you are appropriately related to SQUARE mental state 
of  yours  and  that  your  being  so  related  is  either  identical  with  or  grounds  your 
experiencing SQUARE. Since SQUARE is squareness, that means that you must have a 
mental state that is literally square and that your being related to a square mental state 
explains your experiencing squareness. For both intuitive and empirical reasons, these 
claims are implausible. So we should reject subjectivism. I will call this the problem of 
phenomenal geometry.
If you are a subjectivist, you will of course want to resist the problem. And it seems 
to me that the only somewhat reasonable place to press is on the claim that we can know 
the real definition of SQUARE by being acquainted with it.  So let me consider some 
possible objections to this claim and explain why I do not find them compelling. 
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Objection.  You are confusing what  a  subject  perceptually represents  in 
experience  with  the  quale  she  experiences.  When  you  think  you  are 
attending to SQUARE and making claims about its real definition, really 
you  are  attending  to  the  property  squareness  that  you  happen  to 
perceptually represent when you experience SQUARE. You are, therefore, 
not really making a claim about qualia.
Reply. This doesn’t match my phenomenology at all. I find only one thing 
that I am acquainted with and on which I base my judgments, and it is the 
quale that I call SQUARE. In fact, any quality that I can directly attend to 
in this way is, by my lights, a quale. So I see little reason to think that I am 
guilty of this sort of confusion. 
Objection. Well, at any rate, the epistemic principle you appeal to is false. 
You claim that  we can know the real  definition of  SQUARE by being 
acquainted with it and having sufficient knowledge of geometry. You also 
seem to think that this is a general claim––it holds of all shape qualia. But 
it clearly does not. Suppose that you perceive a thousand-sided figure and 
are acquainted with a shape quale that we can call COMPLEX. Even if you 
are  sufficiently  familiar  with  how  to  geometrically  characterize  a 
thousand-sided figure, you will not be able to know the real definition of 
COMPLEX just by being acquainted with it.
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Reply. Of course, atypical cases and cases where subjects do not or cannot 
properly exploit their epistemic position are to be expected. The case of 
COMPLEX is one of these cases. It is true that our knowledge of shape 
qualia through acquaintance is limited in certain ways. But,  in general, 
when the  shape qualia  in  question are  sufficiently  simple,  we are  in  a 
position to know their real definitions, so long as we are competent with 
certain geometrical concepts. 
Objection. Sure, but the matter is worse than you let on. It simply can’t be 
that it is just geometrical knowledge plus acquaintance that enables you to 
know the real definition of a shape quale. Consider a Molyneux-inspired 
example where a subject, blind since birth, becomes a master geometer. If 
they  one  day  gain  the  power  of  sight  and  become  acquainted  with 
SQUARE, they might nonetheless be incapable of knowing SQUARE’s 
real definition.
Reply. I acknowledge that this is a tricky case. But again, I do not mean to 
suggest that the principle I allude to––that acquaintance with a shape quale 
plus geometric knowledge enables one to know the real definition of that 
quale––is  exceptionless.  It  is  an  epistemic  generalization  and,  like 
generalizations in the special sciences, admits of tolerable exceptions. To 
take  a  more  ordinary  case,  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  situations 
involving tilted coins, many-sided figures, and the like are cases where 
shape qualia have their natures completely revealed to us in acquaintance. 
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Nor  do  I  mean  to  say  that  this  method  of  knowing  is  infallible  or 
foolproof––you  might  have  sufficient  knowledge  of  geometry,  be 
acquainted with a shape quale, and nonetheless be incapable of knowing 
its real definition. All I mean to say is that, in general, where the shape 
quale in question is relatively simple, typically, being acquainted with it 
plus  knowledge  of  geometry  puts  one  in  a  position  to  know  its  real 
definition. In fact, I do not even need this to be a general truth. It only 
needs to hold in one case for there to be a problem for subjectivism.
So, it seems to me that, barring additional considerations, the argument should be allowed 
to pass. And, if it is allow to pass, then we must reject subjectivism.
1.4 Fractured Subjectivism
At least we must reject subjectivism if it is intended to be a fully general claim. For you 
might think that  what the argument shows is  merely that  subjectivism is  false where 
shape qualia are concerned. However, that leaves open the possibility that subjectivism is 
true where color qualia are concerned. In short, we might accept the following fractured 
version of subjectivism:
Fractured subjectivism:  (1)  A subject’s  experiencing  a  color  quale  is 
either identical with or grounded in her being appropriately related to one 
of her mental states that instantiates that quale; however, (2) a subject’s 
experiencing a shape quale is neither identical with nor grounded in her 
being appropriately related to one of her mental states that instantiates that 
quale.
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Fractured  subjectivism  obviously  avoids  the  worries  about  a  more  general  form  of 
subjectivism by restricting the subjectivist thesis to color qualia and explicitly rejecting it 
for shape qualia. But it is, I think, an unlovely view. It would be preferable if we could 
accept a uniform account of experiencing qualia, an account that applies as much to color 
qualia as it does to shape qualia. At this point, I think we need to consider what reasons 
there might be for accepting subjectivism of any sort and see whether they are strong 
enough to warrant considering a fractured theory. 
Recent proponents of subjectivism tend to argue for it by elimination. The thought, it 
seems to me, is that we have narrowed the acceptable theories of perceptual experience to 
two,  some  variety  of  intentionalism  or  else  subjectivism,  and  that  intentionalism  is 
unsatisfactory.
Intentionalism: A subject’s experiencing a quale is either identical with or 
grounded  in  her  being  appropriately  related  to  a  mental  state  that 
represents that quale.
To  explain  the  view,  we  can  rely  on  commonsense  examples  of  representation. 
Utterances,  sentences,  words,  maps,  pictures,  diagrams,  paintings,  thermometers, 
speedometers––all these things have representational features. A painting, for example, 
may represent a certain scene; a speedometer may represent the speed of a car; a sentence 
may represent a state of affairs. The intentionalist holds that––just as paintings represent 
scenes,  speedometers  speeds,  and sentences states  of  affairs––certain mental  states  of 
ours represent qualia. Moreover, our experiencing qualia is identical with or grounded in 
our being appropriately related to states that represent these qualia. However, that does 
not require that the states instantiate  qualia. Just as the word ‘red’ may represent red 
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without being red, our mental states may represent qualia without having qualia. In this 
sense, intentionalism makes room for, and is standardly interpreted as, a radically anti-
subjectivist  view  on  which  qualia  are  nowhere  ‘in  the  head’ of  the  subjects  that 
experience them.  14
David Papineau (2014,  2016) provides the clearest  and,  to  my knowledge,  most 
thorough argument against intentionalism and for subjectivism. He writes:
it now seems to me, as I said, that [intentionalism] is all wrong. I still think 
that sensory experiences are representations all right. But I don’t think that 
the conscious properties that they involve are representational properties. 
By  way  of  analogy,  the  sentences  that  I  am  now  writing  are 
representations,  but  their  shape  properties  are  not  the  same  as  their 
representational  properties.  The  two  are  only  contingently  connected. 
Those shapes could easily have had different representational properties. 
(2014: 1-2)
What Papineau seems to be saying here is this. He admits that mental states that have 
qualia do represent. But the properties they represent are not the qualia we experience––
qualia are not properties represented by our mental states. Rather, they are properties of 
our mental states. In his words:
As an aside,  a  ‘subjectivist’ variety  of  intentionalism is  obviously  coherent.  I  might  think that 14
experiencing a quale is identical with being appropriately related to a mental state that represents 
that quale. However, I might hold that the state represents that quale in virtue of possessing it. We 
might call this a version of projectivist intentionalism on which subjects represent properties of their 
mental states as being instantiated in the external world. Projectivist intentionalism, however, faces 
the problem of phenomenal geometry discussed in the preceding section.
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From my perspective, then, our conscious sensory properties, the ones we 
are  aware  of  when  we  introspect,  are  intrinsic  properties  of  us,  and 
metaphysically quite distinct from the properties of objects that successful 
sensory experience enable us to perceive. The ‘blueness’ that I know to be 
present when I introspect my sense experience is a property of me, not of 
the object out there. (ibid: 23)
The question of course is why we should believe this and, in particular, why we should 
accept the subjectivist story instead of the intentionalist one. 
Papineau  thinks,  in  broad  strokes,  the  most  compelling  answer  comes  from the 
problem of hallucination. 
As noted earlier, representationalists are common factor theorists, taking 
the same conscious properties to be present when I am mistakenly seeing a 
green lemon to be yellow as when I am veridically perceiving a yellow 
one. In both cases I  have the property of representing the lemon to be 
yellow, and the conscious nature of my experience is constituted by this 
common fact.  So  now focus  on  the  case  where  I  have  this  conscious 
experience, yet the lemon is green. Yellowness is still supposed somehow 
to be “present in” my experience. But clearly it is not there in virtue of 
being instantiated. Nothing in this case instantiates yellowness. The lemon 
is not yellow, I am not yellow, and none of my mental states is yellow…I 
must say that I find the representationalist view hard to understand at this 
point. Uninstantiated properties are not located within space and time. It 
seems  strange  that  a  mental  relation  to  such  an  abstract  entity  could 
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constitute  the  phenomenal  character  of  my  experience.  My  conscious 
states  are  here-and-now, local,  the kind of  things that  have causes and 
effects.  How  could  a  mental  relation  to  an  uninstantiated  universal 
constitute this kind of state? (2016: 336-337)
In other words (and to change the example slightly): When we hallucinate (say) a ripe 
orange, but there are no ripe oranges in existence, the subjectivist will simply say that our 
hallucinatory experience is explained by our being related to an ORANGE mental state. 
Similarly, the intentionalist will  say that––although ORANGE might very well be the 
property orangeness––we are merely in a state that represents ORANGE, but states can 
represent properties even if those properties are uninstantiated. (The word ‘orange’ would 
continue  to  represent  orangeness  even  if  all  orange  things  ceased  to  exist.)  Because 
something  may  represent  ORANGE  even  when  it  is  uninstantiated,  it  seems  that 
ORANGE must be an abstract thing. The intentionalist must therefore hold that some 
qualia are abstract and that experiencing a quale sometimes consists in bearing a relation 
to an uninstantiated abstract thing. The puzzle, according to Papineau, is how this could 
be. His objection seems to be that abstract things aren’t located in space or time. But it is 
highly counterintuitive that our experiences should in any way involve things outside of 
space and time. 
However, the intentionalist should, I think, be unfazed. If ORANGE is indeed an 
abstract thing, then the subjectivist must appeal to abstracta in her theory of experience 
just as much as the intentionalist. For on her view, the character of our experiences is in 
part explained by the instantiation of abstracta. It is not obvious why having a theory that 
appeals to the instantiation of abstracta is any less mysterious than a theory that appeals 
to a sort of relation to abstracta. So unless the subjectivist is willing to go in for full-
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blown nominalism about properties, or some version of trope theory, then there seems 
little reason to think the subjectivist has any real advantage over the intentionalist here. 
Perhaps then the issue is merely that the property is uninstantiated,  not that it is 
abstract. But why does Papineau think this is a problem? Perhaps the thought is that if 
experiences are sometimes relations to uninstantiated properties,  then these properties 
must  be  causally  irrelevant  to  the  actual  behavior  of  the  subjects  that  have  these 
experiences. But as I see it, there is no true difficulty here. Provided we bear relations to 
them, uninstantiated properties may be causally relevant to our behavior in the same way 
that false propositions are relevant to our behavior. When I believe falsely that I left the 
stove on, I may nonetheless be caused by this belief to return home and investigate the 
stove. Equally, if the burner looks red to me, even though it is not, the redness may be 
causally relevant to my trying to turn the stove off. I see no genuine obstacle here. 
Another reason, however, might be that it is phenomenologically hard to believe that 
the  properties  we  confront  in  experience  are  uninstantiated.  Agreed.  It  does  seem 
extremely intuitive, at least upon introspection, that qualia are instantiated by something. 
When  ORANGE  is  present  to  me––either  in  veridical  perception,  illusion,  or 
hallucination––it seems to be possessed by some object of some sort. The intentionalist, 
however, will not be able to say this given her standard commitments. For she will tend 
to  say that  ORANGE is  orange––the  property  that  typically  qualifies  the  surfaces  of 
objects that we call ‘orange’––and it could very well be that when one hallucinates an 
orange  thing,  there  is  no  orange  thing  in  existence.  To that  extent,  our  experiencing 
orange will be a matter of bearing a representational relation to an uninstantiated property 
in  cases  of  hallucination.  That,  you  might  think,  goes  against  the  phenomenology. 
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Provided that we are deciding between subjectivism and intentionalism, it might also be a 
reason to prefer the former to the latter. 
The  problem,  however,  is  the  intuition  that  something  instantiates  qualia  is  not 
independent  from an intuition  about  what  instantiates  them.  And,  on  this  matter,  the 
subjectivist gets things all wrong. Qualia––if they seem to be instantiated by anything at 
all––seem to be instantiated by things out there in the external world, not mental states. 
This is what proponents of the so-called transparency of experience have been urging for 
the past three decades. (More on this in a moment.) When you attend to a quality like 
ORANGE,  it  seems  very  much  that  it  is  instantiated  by  something  you  perceive, 
something in front of you. It does not  seem to be instantiated by one of your mental 
states––in fact, it positively seems not to be so instantiated. So if the subjectivist attempts 
to appeal to the intuition that qualia seem to be instantiated, then she must contend with 
the full intuition that qualia seem to be instantiated by things beyond the mind. That is not 
an intuition that speaks in favor of her view. 
1.5 The Argument from Transparency 
And this brings me to one last topic that I would like to discuss: the transparency of 
experience. For the conclusion of my argument––that subjectivism is false––is one that 
would be embraced by those who hold that experiences are transparent to introspection.  15
However,  the  problem  of  transparency  is  distinct  from  the  problem  of  phenomenal 
Harman  (1991)  is,  arguably,  the  catalyst  for  the  prevalence  of  transparency  in  contemporary 15
philosophy  of  mind.  For  other  philosophers  that  endorse  transparency,  see  Byrne  (2009:  434), 
Cutter (2018), Dretske (2003), Hill (2009: 143-145), Jackson (2004, 109), Levine (2010: 212-213), 
Martin (2002), Speaks (2009), Thau (2002: 33-35) and Tye (1995, 2002, 2009, 2014).
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geometry, and it is worth explaining why. In fact, I’d like to highlight how the problem of 
phenomenal geometry might fill a lacuna in the transparentist’s argument. 
The transparentist’s main point is this: 
Transparency: When we introspect qualia, the only properties we directly 
attend to are properties instantiated by things in the external world, insofar 
as they are instantiated by anything at all.
What this is supposed to show, ultimately, is that qualia are not qualities of the mental 
states of subjects that experience them. If this is right, then subjectivism is false. To see 
the argument, one has to do a bit of introspective work. Michael Tye guides us through 
the first few steps in the following passage:
Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue. Intuitively, 
you are directly aware of blueness and squareness as out there in the world 
away from you, as features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze 
inward and try to become aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart 
from  its  objects…The  task  seems  impossible:  one's  awareness  seems 
always  to  slip  through  the  experience  to  blueness  and  squareness,  as 
instantiated together in an external object. In turning one's mind inward to 
attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is 
outside again, on external features or properties. (1995: 30)
It is hard to deny that there is something intuitive about this. The features that we can 
attend to upon introspecting qualia really do seem to be located out there, in the external 
world.  Suppose that  I  see  a  ripe  tomato and experience RED. I  now try  to  turn  my 
attention inward to qualities of my experience––or, for that matter, any of my mental 
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states––and fail. When I attend to RED, the only properties I attend to are properties of 
the tomato, not to any properties of my mental states. So if I attend to RED, but not to 
any qualities of my mental states, then RED is not a quality of one of my mental states. 
And if that is right, then subjectivism is false. 
The  argument,  in  effect,  appeals  to  a  difference  in  de  re  attitude  property  and 
Leibniz’s Law.  It says that RED has the property of being introspectively attended to by 16
me, but arbitrary property F of my mental states does not. Since RED and F differ in their 
properties,  by  Leibniz’s  Law,  RED must  be  distinct  from F.  Since  F  is  an  arbitrary 
property of my mental states, RED cannot be identical with any property of any mental 
states. But if that is right, then subjectivism is false. We cannot, for example, identify my 
experiencing RED with being related to a RED mental state: for none of my mental states 
are RED. Nor can being related to a RED mental state ground my experiencing RED: for, 
again, none of my mental states are RED. Call this the problem of transparency.
Set up in this way, it should be obvious that the problem of transparency is distinct 
from the problem of phenomenal geometry.  While both have as their  conclusion that 
subjectivism is false, the latter problem makes no use of the claim that experiences are 
transparent to introspection. Instead, its core claim is that we can tell that shape qualia are 
geometric qualities and that these geometric qualities are not typically properties of our 
mental states. Moreover, there are difficulties for the problem of transparency that aren’t 
difficulties for the problem of phenomenal geometry. Note that, as I’ve construed it here, 
the argument from transparency is an argument from Leibniz’s Law where the property 
that one thing has, but another lacks, is the property being the object of a psychological 
attitude.  We  should  therefore  be  prepared  for  familiar  difficulties  that  attend  such 
I think this argument is suggested by remarks of Tye (2002: 139). 16
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arguments in the philosophy of mind. I won’t rehearse these (hopefully familiar) issues 
here.  17
Instead, let me point out some ways that the subjectivist might reply to the problem 
of  transparency.  A common  strategy  is  to  insist  that,  in  some  respect  or  another, 
experiences are not always  transparent to introspection––they are, as we might put it, 
translucent.  We  can,  to  some  extent,  ‘see  through  them’,  but  they  are  not  entirely 
transparent to us:
Translucency: When we introspect qualia, sometimes the properties we 
directly  attend  to  are  properties  instantiated  by  things  in  the  external 
world, and sometimes they are properties of our mental states. 
Visual blur is a familiar example that is often meant to support translucency. For in cases 
of blur, we do not even seem to be attending to features of objects out there in the world. 
Perhaps  there  are  even  stronger  cases  where  it  seems  obvious  that  we  do  attend  to 
features  of  our  mental  states  themselves.  There  are  also  tricky  cases,  for  example, 
involving  temporal  properties.  It  is  plausible  that  we  attend  to  certain  temporal 
properties––like duration––upon introspection of  our experiences.  In general,  we take 
these temporal properties to be properties of events external to us. It is, say, the tomato’s 
rolling down the hill that seems to last for a certain period of time. But it might very well 
be that the duration of the tomato’s rolling is identical with the duration of my experience 
of  it  rolling.  To that  extent,  I  might  be  said  to  attend to  a  temporal  property  of  my 
experience. 
See Paul Churchland 1985. The similarities between the arguments he considers and the argument 17
from transparency are striking. 
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At any rate, none of these points is especially helpful to the subjectivist. If her thesis 
is  fully  general,  she  cannot  allow  that  experience  is  in  any  way  transparent  to 
introspection. Translucency, in other words, isn’t enough. The subjectivist must endorse 
something stronger: she must hold that whenever we introspectively attend to a quale, the 
property we attend to is a property of one our mental states. 
Opacity:  When  we  introspect  qualia,  the  only  properties  we  directly 
attend  to  are  properties  instantiated  by  our  mental  states  and  never 
qualities instantiated by things in the external world. 
Why? Because if there is even one quale that is such that, when we attend to it, we are 
not attending to a property of our mental states, then subjectivism is mistaken. For the 
subjectivist  will  then have to admit that  the transparency argument is  to some extent 
successful––some qualia are not properties of our mental states. But subjectivism is a 
fully general thesis, and if the transparency argument is to any extent successful, then that 
means subjectivism must be false. So, the subjectivist, unless she wishes to weaken her 
view, must insist that our experiences are opaque.
If she is to respond to the transparentist, she must at least make her endorsement of 
the opacity claim defensible. How should she do this? In my view, the subjectivist should 
concede, to some extent, to the transparentist: it does seem that, when we introspectively 
attend to qualia, we are attending to qualities of things out there in the world. Denying 
this would just be bad phenomenology. But putting things in this way makes clear an 
intermediary step that the subjectivist might challenge, namely, that qualia are as they 
introspectively seem. Let’s focus on RED. The subjectivist should say that, though RED 
seems to be out there in the world, and not a quality of a state internal to me, it is not. 
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Really, RED is a mere quality of one of my mental states. Introspective appearances do 
not match the facts. 
There is significant pressure, however, for the subjectivist to fill in this picture. For, 
at  first  blush,  the  proponent  of  transparency  will  (and  should)  find  this  reply 
unconvincing. Pick any claim p.  It  is  not a satisfactory objection to p  to merely say, 
“Though it seems that p, in reality not-p.” (If it were, philosophy would either be much 
easier or much harder, depending on which side of this sort of objection one fell.) Rather 
than merely assert that things are not as they seem, we need to offer up some explanation 
of why things are or might not be as they seem––either by arguing for not-p or explaining 
why the appearance that p  might be misleading.  Relatedly, claiming that experience 18
merely seems transparent/translucent, but is instead opaque, is not a compelling reason to 
reject  introspective  appearances.  The  subjectivist  needs  to  either  argue  against 
translucency or else explain why introspective appearances might fail us. Put differently, 
the subjectivist therefore needs a defeater. Either she needs a rebutting defeater––some 
evidence  directly  shows  that  experience  is  not  even  translucent.  Or  she  needs  an 
undercutting defeater that dispels the presumptive force of introspective appearances. 
Providing  a  rebutting  defeater  is  a  more  ambitious  route  than  I  am  willing  to 
consider here––moreover,  I  do not know of any convincing,  direct  arguments against 
translucency. Instead, if anything, the subjectivist should go for an undercutting defeater 
with an aim to reduce our confidence in the veracity of introspective appearances. Her 
best  bet––both because it  is  dialectically  effective and independently plausible––is  to 
appeal to our limited powers of introspection. 
This is because appearances have defeasible justificatory power––if it appears to one that p, then 18
that  is  at  least  some justification for believing p.  I’m appealing here to a variant  of something 
known as the principle of phenomenal conservatism. See Michael Huemer 2007. 
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In initially formulating the claim about transparency, I said that the transparentist’s 
core claim is, roughly, that qualia are instantiated by external objects insofar as they are 
instantiated  by  anything  at  all.  This  qualification  is  meant  to  accommodate  cases  of 
illusion an hallucination when no external object has the relevant quale. But how could 
we come to know this conditional claim through being acquainted with qualia? It must 
somehow be that by being acquainted with qualia, we can somehow tell that they are the 
sort of things that are instantiated by external objects. The only sense I can make of this 
is to say that, somehow, we must be able to know the real definitions of qualia when we 
are acquainted with them. The problem, however, is that transparentists tend to explicitly 
formulate their arguments in a way that blocks this option. Tye, in formulating his version 
of the argument, writes that:
no definite claim is being made as to the identity of each of the relevant 
qualities…The  point  that  matters  for  present  purposes  is  simply  this. 
Whatever the nature of the qualities of which we are directly aware when 
we focus upon how the surfaces before us look,  these qualities are not 
experienced as qualities of our experience but rather as qualities of the 
surfaces. (2002, 138)
But now the subjectivist  should wonder: if  no definite claim is being made as to the 
nature of qualia, how can the transparentist have the crucial claim that qualia are the sort 
of things that can only be instantiated by external objects? And how can transparency 
work as an argument against subjectivism if we don’t have this claim? 
Here,  I  think the  problem of  phenomenal  geometry  can help.  Maybe,  as  I  have 
suggested, color qualia have their natures hidden from us when we are acquainted with 
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them. But shape qualia do not. We can tell that they are geometric qualities, and, with a 
bit of commonsense reasoning, that they are geometric qualities that are not typically 
properties of our mental states. If they are properties of anything at all, they are properties 
of  objects  out  there  in  the  world.  This,  of  course,  does  not  quite  get  us  the  full 
transparentist claim that all qualia are, if properties of anything at all, properties of things 
in the world.  But it gives us enough to see what the transparentist got right. To that 19
extent, we can, if we like, think of the problem of phenomenal geometry and the problem 
of transparency as a pair. Subjectivists are trying to kick qualia out of the world and into 
the mind. But we, armed with these problems, can put both qualia and subjectivists where 
they belong. 
The following might seem a promising line of thought: There is a strong intuition that (for example) 19
color qualia and spatial qualia are coinstantiated. Whatever instantiates color qualia also instantiates 
spatial qualia, and vice versa. But since our mental states do not typically instantiate spatial qualia, 
so it seems quite unlikely that they instantiate color qualia. The problem is that the coinstantiation 
intuition faces  difficulty  in  light  of  certain  sorts  of  illusion where,  intuitively,  a  color  quale  is 
instantiated but a spatial quale is not, or vice versa. It is not, therefore, clear whether we could rely 
on this intuition to get the full blown transparency claim. 
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2. INTENTIONALISM FOR NAÏVE REALISTS
The latter portion of the 20th century witnessed what we might call The Intentionalist 
Revolution in the philosophy of mind. Philosophers––led by seminal works from Fred 
Dretske (1995),  William Lycan (1996),  and Michael  Tye (1995)––began to think that 
there was an essential  connection between conscious experience and intentionality.  In 
fact, it seemed that experience might just be a species of intentionality. A potential bridge 
across the explanatory gap was exposed: if we can cross the gap between the physical and 
the intentional, then, if experience is a species of intentionality, we can also cross the gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal. 
Post-Revolution,  intentionalism  became  one  of  the  most  popular  theories  of 
perceptual  experience.  But  it  has  developed  rivals.  In  particular,  naïve  realists  often 
advertise their theory of perceptual experience (which I will explain shortly) as a viable 
anti-intentionalist alternative. This paper is, in part, an expression of confusion about the 
naïve realist’s marketing strategy. The source of my confusion is this: every core naïve 
realist thesis I can think of––at least the ones that are supposed to be incompatible with 
intentionalism––admits of an intentionalist precisification. And, to that extent, the views 
need not be rivals at all. Accordingly, this paper can be viewed as part of a wave of recent 
attempts to reconcile intentionalism and naïve realism. 
2.1 Intentionalism
Let me start by saying a bit about intentionalism. As I see it, the primary insight of the 
intentionalist  is  that there is an important analogy between perceptual experience and 
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familiar intentional attitudes––attitudes like believing, hoping, desiring, and so on. In the 
words of intentionalists (and their opponents):
[P]erceiving is very much like a traditional propositional attitude, such as 
believing or intending ... when one has a perceptual experience, one bears 
the perception relation to a certain proposition p. (Byrne 2005: 453)
I take as “intentionalist” . . . the theory which treats perception as a kind of 
propositional attitude, akin to belief. (Crane 1998: 233) 
An  intentional  theory  of  perception  claims  that…experiences  have  an 
intentional content that represents the world as being some way. This is to 
see experiences as akin to propositional attitudes such as beliefs. (Martin 
1994: 745) 
At  the  more  radical  end  of  the  spectrum––the  end  that  will  concern  me  here––the 
intentionalist thinks that to have an experience just is to bear an intentional attitude to a 
content. 
Intentionalism:  Having  an  experience  is  identical  with  bearing  an 
intentional attitude to a content.
Consider a familiar  intentional  attitude like believing.  Suppose that  I  believe that  the 
Earth is round. Intuitively, what I believe––the content of my belief––is the proposition 
that the Earth is round. Moreover, my having this belief is, in some sense, just a matter of 
my bearing the belief relation to this proposition. The intentionalist thinks that a similar 
story  holds  for  experiences.  Just  as  to  have  a  belief  is  to  bear  a  distinctive  kind  of 
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intentional attitude to a content, to have an experience is to bear a distinctive kind of 
intentional attitude to a content. We have no name for this attitude in English, but we 
might follow Byrne 2009 and call the attitude EX-ing (which is intended to be suggestive 
of ‘experiencing’). So the intentionalist’s view, condensed, is that to have an experience 
is to EX a content. 
What  sort  of  content?  In  the  case  of  belief,  it  is  fairly  clear––perhaps  even 
definitionally true––that the contents are propositions. Now, the intentionalist could opt 
for a non-propositional variety of intentionalism. For example, some intentionalists hold 
that the contents we EX are properties (Pautz 2007). But for my purposes, the choice 
between propositional and non-propositional varieties of intentionalism doesn’t matter, so 
I work with a propositional variety for simplicity. 
However, there is a question about what sort of propositions are well-suited to the 
intentionalist’s  theoretical  aims.  The  standard  space  of  theories  divides  into  coarse-
grained  views,  fine-grained  views,  and  hyper-fine-grained  views.  On  coarse-grained 
views, propositions are no more finely individuated than the sets of possible worlds at 
which they are true. Usually, the coarse-grained view identifies a proposition with the set 
of possible worlds at which it is true. On fine-grained views, however, propositions are––
as  the  name  suggests––more  finely  individuated.  They  are  typically  thought  to  be 
complexes––structured  or  otherwise––of  familiar  worldly  entities  like  particulars, 
properties, kinds, and so on. On hyper-fine-grained views, propositions are even more 
finely  individuated.  Rather  than  identify  propositions  with  complexes  of  objects  and 
properties, the hyper-fine-grained view identifies them with ‘modes of presentation’ of 
objects and properties. But since the relation between an object or property and its modes 
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of  presentation  is  one-to-many,  the  hyper-fine-grained  view  recognizes  even  more 
distinctions between propositions than its fine-grained cousin. 
Intentionalists tend to go in for the second of these three views––the fine-grained 
view. The reason for this, I suspect, has much to do with the transparency of experience. 
The idea behind transparency is that whenever you try to introspectively attend to one of 
your perceptual experiences, the only things you end up attending to are things in the 
external environment. An example: At the moment, I see a bright red cardinal outside my 
window. It periodically flaps its wings, adjusting its position on the bird-feeder, causing 
the sunlight to strike its feathers at varying angles. As I attend to my visual experience 
upon seeing the cardinal, I am presented with various colors and shapes––in particular a 
bright shade of red and a well-defined cardinal-shape. If these are properties of anything, 
they are properties of the cardinal. Indeed, try as I might, any effort to turn my attention 
inward to my experience results in my attention being turned outward, back onto the 
external world––or so the proponent of transparency would have us think. 
Now, if having an experience is just a matter of EX-ing a fine-grained proposition, 
then there is a fairly natural explanation of this: the fine-grained propositions we EX are 
propositions that have mind-independent objects and the properties of those objects as 
constituents. When I attempt to attend to my experience of the cardinal, the reason that I 
attend  to  the  cardinal  and  its  properties  is  because  I  attend  to  the  content  of  my 
experience––i.e. the proposition I EX––and this content has the cardinal and its properties 
as constituents. If I want this explanation, I need a fine-grained account of propositions. 
Since  transparency  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  that  so  many  have  flocked  to 
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intentionalism, I am going to assume a fine-grained account of propositions here––at least 
as far as the propositions we EX are concerned.20
While I am on the topic, let me give two other reasons that you might be inclined to 
accept intentionalism. One is that the intentionalist looks to be able to explain cases of 
perceptual illusion in a way that is analogous to how we would explain cases of false 
belief. If I believe that there is a red chair before me, but there is not, then what I believe 
is false and I have a false belief. Similarly, suppose it perceptually seems to me that there 
is a red chair before me, but there is not. The intentionalist explains this in terms of my 
EX-ing a  false  proposition to  the  effect  that  there  is  a  red  chair  before  me.  Illusory 
experiences are, in a certain sense, just like false beliefs. 
Another  (under-appreciated)  reason for  accepting  intentionalism is  its  theoretical 
elegance. The idea that there is some bifurcation of mental kinds––intentional and non-
intentional––might seem to produce an unlovely account of mentality. Surely it would be 
better if we were able to endorse a unified picture on which all mental phenomena are, in 
some sense, of the same basic kind. Intentionalism, in my view, is the only plausible 
theory  of  perceptual  experience  that  is  capable  of  this.  It  shows  us  how perceptual 
experience––though special in a variety of respects––is just one among many intentional 
attitudes.
I want to flag that weaker varieties of intentionalism are available. For example, the 
intentionalist might merely hold that any two subjects who are intentional duplicates are 
experiential duplicates––i.e. she might hold that experience supervenes on the intentional. 
Or she might hold the converse: any two subjects that are experiential  duplicates are 
intentional duplicates. Alternatively, she might hold that to have an experience of a given 
In the case of thought, the propositions might be hyper-fine-grained. 20
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sort is grounded in bearing a kind of intentional attitude to a content or, again, vice versa: 
that  bearing  an  intentional  attitude  to  content  is  grounded  in  having  certain  sorts  of 
experiences. She might even hold that the grounding relation is a partial one: having an 
experience is merely partially grounded in bearing an intentional attitude to a content. At 
any rate there are many varieties of intentionalism that we could investigate. However, 
for  present  purposes,  I  am interested  in  the  stronger,  identity  formulation  I’ve  given 
above. 
2.2 Naïve Realism v. Intentionalism
Naïve realism gets its name because, on the face of it, it seems to be something like the 
view of experience that many of us have prior to engaging in philosophy or science. For 
instance, naïve realists often say things to the effect that “perception, as such, simply 
places  our  surroundings  in  view” (Travis,  2004:  65),  that  “perceptual  experience  [is] 
fundamentally  a  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  things  experienced  (Campbell, 
2011: 1), or that 
the actual objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables 
and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they can 
manifest  to  one  when  perceived,  partly  constitute  one’s  conscious 
experience (Martin, 2009 [1997]: 93)
There seems––just on the face of it––something deeply intuitive about all this. It really 
does seem that our perceptual experience puts us into a sort of unmediated contact with 
things in the outside world. The naïve realist captures this intuitive point and runs with it, 
developing a full blown theory of perceptual experience. 
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However, naïve realism is supposed to be a competitor to intentionalism. This is 
why, in recent years, philosophers have sought to reconcile the two views.  But I think it 21
is worth taking a step back and trying to see exactly where the apparent conflict is. What 
exactly is anti-intentionalist about naïve realism?
Let’s  impose  two  constraints  on  this  search.  First,  whatever  the  supposed 
disagreement between intentionalists and naïve realists is, it is not that the naïve realist is 
committed to disjunctivism whereas the intentionalist is not.  To get a handle on what 22
disjunctivism is supposed to be, imagine you veridically perceive a red apple and are 
having experience VA. Suppose now that you hallucinate a red apple and have experience 
HA.  The  so-called  ‘common  factor  theorist’ will  say  that  these  experiences  are  of 
precisely the same kind––they are identical. However, on disjunctive theories, there is 
some  deep  divide  between  the  two.  What  it  is  to  have  an  experience  in  veridical 
perception  is  much  different  than  what  it  is  to  have  an  experience  in  hallucination. 
Having a ‘red apple experience’ is either a matter of having some sort of property or a 
matter of having some other sort of property. I grant that, for reasons that will become 
obvious, the naïve realist is committed to disjunctivism. However, I doubt that this is the 
source of conflict between the two views. This is for two reasons. First, it just so happens 
that some varieties of intentionalism (e.g. Tye 2009) are versions of disjunctivism. They 
are disjunctive at the level of content––to have a veridical experience is to EX a singular 
proposition whereas to have a non-veridical experience is to EX a ‘gappy’ proposition. 
Another  reason  to  think  that  the  dispute  between  common  factor  theorists  and 
I have in mind Logue (2014), Mehta (2014), Nanay (2015), Schellenberg (2010, 2014), and Tye 21
(2014). Hints of a reconciliation similar to the one I seek can be found in McDowell (2013).
 Pautz (2010a) gives a nice overview of the varieties of disjunctivism.22
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disjunctivists is not central is that naïve realists themselves often tend to proceed as if we 
are faced with a choice between naïve realism and intentionalism independently of the 
issue of disjunctivism. M.G.F. Martin (2002), for example, dedicates an entire paper to 
settling the dispute between naïve realists and intentionalists without raising the matter of 
disjunctivism. Similarly, some philosophers––like Heather Logue (2012, 2014)––make it 
their explicit goal to show that naïve realism and intentionalism are compatible. This is 
supposed to be surprising. So I take it that there is at least some implicitly shared belief 
that intentionalism and naïve realism are prima facie at odds with one another. 
Second,  I  want  to  know what  positive  thesis  is  endorsed  by  naïve  realists  that 
renders  their  view anti-intentionalist.  For  there  are  obviously  negative  theses  that,  if 
baked into either theory, would render the views incompatible. For example, if the naïve 
realist––as she often does––explicitly denies that anything like contents or intentional 
attitudes are involved in a correct theory of perceptual experience, then there is some sort 
of incompatibility between intentionalism and naïve realism. But this seems to me a fairly 
superficial  sort  of  incompatibility.  Any two theories can be rendered incompatible by 
appending to one the denial of the other. I want to know what it is about naïve realism 
that suggests the falsity of intentionalism in the first place. 
2.2.1 CONSTITUTION
To do this, let’s take a look at some positive naïve realist theses––starting with the one I 
used to introduce the view. The naïve realist, as Martin puts it, holds that
Constitution:  In  veridical  cases,  perceived objects  and their  properties 
partially constitute the subject’s experience. 
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So, for example, when I see a red cardinal, and the cardinal is as it looks to me, the 
experience I have is a veridical one and the naïve realist will say that my experience is, in 
some sense,  just  a  relation between me and a state of  affairs  out  there in the world: 
namely, the cardinal’s being red––a state of affairs that has the cardinal and its redness as 
constituents. It is sometimes suggested that this principle distinguishes the naïve realist 
from the intentionalist. For example, James Genone writes that 
when  naïve  realists  claim  that  perceived  objects  and  properties  are 
constitutive  of  perceptual  experience…[their]  idea  goes  against  most 
mainstream  views  about  the  nature  of  consciousness  associated  with 
[intentionalist] theories of perception. (2016: 9)
Similarly, Matthew Kennedy, in arguing that transparency supports naïve realism but not 
intentionalism, writes that it is a “commitment” of intentionalism that “material objects 
are not constituent-objects of veridical experiences” (2009: 580).23
I find these remarks puzzling. In fact, many intentionalists have explicitly endorsed 
something  like  the  constitution  thesis.  As  mentioned  in  the  last  section,  in  order  to 
accommodate  the  transparency  of  experience,  intentionalists  often  hold  that  the 
propositions we EX are fine-grained propositions with worldly objects and properties as 
constituents. Some even say that these propositions are something like states of affairs 
composed out of perceived objects and their properties. Michael Tye, for example, writes:
[w]hat  is  the  robustly  nonconceptual  content  of  an  experience?  One 
answer is that such a content is a set of possible worlds. Another answer is 
Kennedy goes on to qualify this point, seemingly acknowledging that there may be exceptions to 23
the claim. However, it is misleading to say that this is in any way a commitment of intentionalism in 
the first place.
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that each robustly nonconceptual content is a possible state of affairs built 
out of worldly entities…Of these two accounts, I prefer the second…In 
my  view,  objects  and  properties  enter  into  the  contents  of  visual 
experience. (2009: 104)
So, for example, when you see the cardinal, Tye would hold that you EX the state of 
affairs of that very cardinal’s being red. The example generalizes. The intentionalist may 
endorse the following:
Intentionalist Constitution:  In veridical cases, the states of affairs that 
we  EX  are  states  of  affairs  with  external  objects  and  properties  as 
constituents. 
And,  in  this  sense,  our  experiences  do  have  perceived  objects  and  properties  as 
constituents. So if there is conflict between intentionalism and naïve realism, it is not 
here. The constitution thesis admits of intentionalist precisification. 
2.2.2 FACTIVITY
Perhaps  instead  the  conflict  is  in  the  relation  that  we  bear  to  perceived  objects  and 
properties. According to Martin, the naïve realist holds “that one could not be having the 
very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the 
features they are perceived to have” (2009 [1997]: 93.) Similarly, Fish writes:
The distinctive feature of naive realism lies in the claim that, when we see 
the world, the subject is acquainted with…mind-independent objects and 
their features––where ‘acquaintance’ names an irreducible mental relation 
that the subject can only stand in to objects that exist and features that are 
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instantiated in the part of the environment at which the subject is looking. 
(2009: 14)
The relation that the naïve realist thinks we bear to the objects and properties that are 
constituents of our experiences has a certain modal property. It is, as I will put it, factive:
Factivity: The relation that a subject bear to objects and properties, when 
those objects and properties are constituents of her experience, is such that 
it could not hold unless the relevant objects existed and instantiated the 
properties she experiences. 
For precisely this reason, naïve realism seems incapable of accounting for non-veridical 
experiences––like illusion––where a thing is experienced to be a way that it is not. To see 
why this might be a problem for the intentionalist, think about how she tends to handle 
cases  of  illusion.  She  will  say  that  we  EX  a  false  fine-grained  proposition  which, 
following Tye, I will assume is a state of affairs. If EX-ing were factive, then I would not 
be able to bear it to states of affairs that fail to obtain. But suppose then that I see a green 
ball but it looks red to me. The intentionalist will say I EX the state of affairs the ball’s 
being red––a state of affairs that does not obtain. But if this is right, then EX-ing cannot 
be factive. I can bear it to properties that are not instantiated by the objects I experience. 
Factivity does, on the face of it, seem to be something that the intentionalist cannot 
embrace. But this is only if we needlessly constrain intentionalism. There is no reason 
that the intentionalist must model EX-ing on believing. As Adam Pautz puts it:
Intentionalism says only that  experiences are  relations to  contents.  But 
some  relations  to  contents,  for  instance  desiring  and  entertaining  in 
thought, do not have a mind to world direction of fit. So even when they 
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have  a  false  content,  one  cannot  say  that  the  states  themselves  are 
inaccurate, or in error. Maybe it is the same with experiences. They tend to 
induce  beliefs  because  they  have  a  rich  phenomenology.  But  maybe, 
unlike beliefs, they themselves do not have a mind to world direction of 
fit…Error only enters the picture when the subject takes the experience at 
face value and forms a false belief. (2009, 498)
EX-ing, for all the intentionalist has said, may be best modeled as a desire-like relation or 
a relation like entertaining in thought. The point is that the intentionalist needn’t decide 
just by virtue of being an intentionalist. She may freely choose––evidence permitting––
which of the intentional attitudes serves as the best model for EX-ing. 
In fact, the intentionalist may model EX-ing, not on believing, but on knowing. That 
is, like knowing, she may take EX-ing to be a factive attitude. Knowing is factive just in 
the sense that,  necessarily,  if  S knows that  p,  then p  is  true––the knowledge relation 
cannot  obtain  between  subjects  and  false  propositions.  The  intentionalist  may  say 
something  similar  of  EX-ing.  The  relation  cannot  obtain  between  subjects  and  false 
propositions. But since the propositions in question are just states of affairs, we replace 
the notion of being true with the notion of obtaining. If so, this gives us:
Intentionalist Factivity: In veridical cases, EX-ing is factive in the sense 
that,  necessarily if  a state of affairs is  EX-ed, then that state of affairs 
obtains. 
This, I take it, is clearly an intentional precisification of the factivity thesis. 
You might wonder though how the intentionalist can say this. Isn’t her thesis fully 
general? And if so, what is she going to say about cases of illusion? The solution here is 
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relatively straightforward. It begins by noting that there is no need to assume that the 
intentionalist  must  appeal  to  the  same  attitude  across  all  cases  of  experience.  For 
example, in an intentionalist mood, Tim Crane writes,
the difference between feeling one’s leg to be damaged and seeing it to be 
damaged is just the difference between feeling and seeing. In other words, 
it is a difference in what…I call mode, and what others would call attitude. 
We already know that sameness of content does not suffice for sameness 
of  mental  states  in  general;  a  belief  and  a  hope  might  have  the  same 
content.  So  why  should  we  expect  that  it  suffices  for  sameness  of 
phenomenal states…? (2014, 480)
I do not agree with Crane’s initial remark, but I think he is illustrating an important point. 
The intentionalist could appeal to different attitudes when there is a difference in sense 
modality. But she could also appeal to different attitudes when there is a difference in 
veridicality.  Suppose  that  the  intentionalist  recognizes  a  distinction  between  two 
attitudes:  EX-ing and NEX-ing.  In  veridical  cases,  our  experiences  consist  in  EX-ing 
contents,  but  in  non-veridical  cases,  they  consist  in  NEX-ing  contents.  What’s  the 
difference? NEX-ing, unlike EX-ing, is an attitude much like believing in that it is non-
factive. So, the intentionalist could very well accept factivity if she wished and hold a 
fully  general  version  of  her  view.  This  is  not  where  the  essential  conflict  between 
intentionalism and naïve realism resides either.
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2.2.3 PHENOMENAL CONSTITUTION
But perhaps this raises a worry. Maybe factivity doesn’t accurately capture what the naïve 
realist wants to get at in the first place. Consider something that William Fish, in his 
illuminating book-length defense of naïve realism, claims: 
the central feature of visual perception that the naive realist is trying to 
codify is the idea that, when we see the world, the objects that inhabit the 
environment, together with their properties and other features, shape the 
contours of the subject’s conscious experience. (2009: 49)
Fish seems to spell out the idea of ‘shaping’ in terms of a modal notion––what I have 
called ‘factivity’. Yet I think the intuitive idea he is trying to capture is better suited to the 
tools  of  ‘postmodal’ metaphysics.  The  reason  that  I  think  this  has  to  do  with  the 
explanation  that  Fish  gives  of  the  ‘shaping’ metaphor––a metaphor  he  borrows from 
Martin (2004: 64). He claims that ‘shaping’ is
to be read in a constitutive rather than a merely causal sense. Consider the 
following scenario: looking down at a glacial valley, I say to you, “Can 
you see  how the  glacier  shaped the  contours  of  the  landscape?” Here, 
‘shaping’ is being used in a causal sense—the glacier shaped the contours 
of the landscape by causing the elements of the landscape to be the shape 
they  are.  On  this  reading  of  ‘shaping,’ the  claim that  external  objects 
“shape the contours” of conscious experiences would in fact be compatible 
with any metaphysically realist theory of perception. But if I were to ask 
instead, “Can you see how the sides of the hills shape the contours of the 
landscape?” I would be using ‘shaping’ not in a causal sense but rather in a 
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constitutive sense—on this reading, the hillsides shape the contours of the 
landscape by actually being the contours of the landscape. This, I suggest, 
is how we should understand the naive realist’s claim that external objects 
and  their  properties  shape  the  contours  of  the  subject’s  conscious 
experience: they shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience 
by  actually  being  the  contours  of  the  subject’s  conscious  experience. 
(2009: 6)
So, to stick with the analogy, the hillsides shape the contours of the landscape by being 
the contours of the landscape. I can only read this as an identity or a constitution claim: 
the contours of the landscape are identical with or constituted by the hillsides themselves. 
It therefore seems to me that the core idea that Fish is trying to capture, when imported to 
the domain of experience, must be something like this:
Phenomenal  Constitution:  In  any  case  of  veridical  experience,  the 
experience’s phenomenal character is identical with or constituted by an 
actually-obtaining, external state of affairs. 
The phenomenal character of a given experience is, as it is so often put, what it is like to 
have that experience. There is something it is like for you to have the experience that you 
do when you see a red apple. The naïve realist claims, in effect, that what it is like is or is 
constituted by  an obtaining mind-independent state of affairs consisting in the apple’s 
being red and apple-shaped. As John Campbell puts it:
the  phenomenal  character  of  your  experience,  as  you  look  around  the 
room,  is  constituted  by  the  actual  layout  of  the  room  itself:  which 
particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and 
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shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you. 
(2002: 116)
Can the intentionalist accept this?
Again,  the  answer  is  yes.  If  this  is  what  the  naïve  realist  is  after,  then  the 
intentionalist  is happy to oblige. Usually, the intentionalist  holds that the phenomenal 
character of a given experience is constituted by the proposition that is EX-ed in having 
that  experience.  But,  as  I  have  been  stressing,  because  of  the  phenomenon  of 
transparency, the intentionalist tends to hold that EX-ed propositions are states of affairs 
built out of worldly objects and their properties. Tye, for example, writes that
What  my  experience  is  like—what  is  often  called  ‘the  phenomenal 
character of my experience’—is not a property of my experience. The only 
properties of which I am aware are external properties, including the color 
red. So, the phenomenal character of my experience is a cluster of external 
properties. In the simplest case, it is just the color red. (2015: 484)
This gives us something like:
Intentionalist  Phenomenal  Constitution:  In  any  case  of  veridical 
experience,  the  experience’s  phenomenal  character  is  constituted by its 
content and an actually-obtaining, external state of affairs is its content. 
When you see the red apple and EX the apple’s being red and apple-shaped, the character 
of  your experience is  constituted by that  very state  of  affairs.  Moreover,  in  veridical 
cases, that state of affairs actually obtains. So it seems that the intentionalist does have a 
view on which the external environment ‘shapes’ the contours of one’s experience. Again, 
there just does not seem to be conflict here.
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2.2.4 PHENOMENAL GROUNDING
But maybe naïve realists are after an even more ambitious claim––although it is not one 
that they have, in my view, adequately articulated.  Perhaps they do not just want to say 24
that external states of affairs constitute the character of our veridical experiences. Rather, 
what they want to say is that it is partly in virtue of external states of affairs obtaining that 
our veridical experiences have the characters that they do. 
Phenomenal Grounding: In veridical cases, it is the obtaining of a certain 
mind-independent  state  of  affairs  that  partially  grounds  the  fact  that  a 
subject has an experience with a given phenomenal character.
Here’s the thought. Suppose I have a red light. The light flashes on and off more or less at 
random. For the past few minutes though, the light has been on. Suppose that I also have 
an apple of precisely the same shade of red. The color of the light, then, is identical with 
the color of the apple––they have the same color. If ‘shaping’ were merely identity or 
constitution, then the color of the apple would shape the color of the light. But this is 
clearly not what the naïve realist has in mind and would serve as a poor metaphor for her 
view of experience. Rather, it seems to me that what she wants is something like this. 
Suppose I build a large robot and make the red light one of its eyes. As the light flashes 
red, one of the robot’s eyes will be red. The color of the light ‘shapes’ the color of the 
robot’s eye in the following sense: it is the fact that the light is red that partially grounds 
the fact that the robot’s eye is red. Put differently, but equivalently for my purposes, it is 
the obtaining of the state of affairs the light’s being red that partially grounds the fact that 
the robot has a red eye. 
Heather Logue (2014) comes close. 24
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Phenomenal  grounding  seems  to  me  a  better  candidate  for  a  positive,  anti-
intentionalist,  pro-naïve  realist  claim.  For  now  it  is  a  bit  harder  to  see  how  the 
intentionalist can agree with the naïve realist. When you see a red apple, the naïve realist 
will say that the character of your experience is partially grounded in the fact that the 
state of affairs the apple’s being red and apple-shaped obtains. Now the intentionalist can 
say that (1) the apple’s being red and round grounds the character of the experience and 
(2) this state of affairs obtains. But this doesn’t quite capture the phenomenal grounding 
claim.  It  is  not  just  that  an  obtaining  state  of  affairs  grounds  the  character  of  your 
experience. Rather, it is the very fact that the state of affairs obtains that grounds the 
character of your experience. But to secure this, it’s not enough that EX-ing is factive or 
even that EX-ed states of affairs are constitutive of phenomenal character. That a relation 
is  factive  is  a  modal  claim,  and modal  claims are,  in  general,  not  enough to  secure 
grounding claims––just because the relation could not have obtained if the relevant state 
of  affairs  had not  doesn’t  mean that  the obtaining of  the relation is  grounded in  the 
obtaining of the state of affairs. 
What would it take for the intentionalist to be able to accept the grounding claim? 
Well first, to be clear, grounding  is an irreflexive, asymmetric, and (maybe) transitive 
relation that may hold between entities of different ontological categories (e.g. between 
facts and objects, properties and events, states of affairs and dispositions, etc.). I think we 
have a decent pre-theoretical grasp of this relation. For example, it is the salient relation 
that  the  members  of  a  set  bear  to  the  existence  of  the  set  itself,  that  the  molecular 
structure of a mug bears to the mug’s fragility, that the truth of a disjunct bears to the 
truth  of  a  disjunction,  and  so  on.  Its  converse  is  the  relation  of  (metaphysical) 
dependence. The existence of a set depends on the existence of its members, the mug’s 
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fragility depends on its molecular structure, the truth of a disjunction depends on the truth 
of one or more of its disjuncts. 
Now, if we assume (as is reasonable) that the intentionalist thinks that to have an 
experience with a given phenomenal character just is to EX a certain proposition, then 
she would have to say something along the following lines: subject (at least in veridical 
cases) EXs that p partly in virtue of the fact that p. Or, equivalently for my purposes, a 
subject EXs a state of affairs in veridical cases partly in virtue of the fact that the state of 
affairs  obtains.  However,  all  this  is––on  the  intentionalist  picture––is  an  interesting 
metasemantic claim.
Intentionalist Phenomenal Grounding:  A subject (at least in veridical 
cases) EXs that p partly in virtue of the fact that p. 
As I understand it, a metasemantic claim is one that tells us what grounds the obtaining of 
some  intentional  relation  or  another.  For  example,  a  metasemantic  theory  of,  say, 
sentences in English will tell us in virtue of what an English sentence means what it does. 
More precisely, it will offer a metaphysical explanation of why certain symbols bear the 
meaning-in-English relation to certain entities in the relevant set of meanings. There are 
of course various metasemantic proposals available to the intentionalist––like Dretske’s 
teleosemantic-account (1995) and Tye’s causal covariation account (1995). However, this 
is––I think all will agree––one of the areas of intentionalism that is still in its infancy. The 
best that we have at the moment are really “theory sketches” (Byrne and Tye 2006: 253) 
that  are  programmatic  and  merely  suggestive  of  the  direction  in  which  a  completed 
theory might reside. This is all just to say: the intentionalist should be, and generally is, 
open to various possibilities for metasemantic theories. She does not usually bake any 
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particular theory into her view. But to that extent, she could very easily endorse a ‘naïve 
realist’ metasemantics. She could say that, in veridical cases, a subject EXs that p at least 
partly in virtue of the fact that p. And that means that she can accept the phenomenal 
grounding claim. It  is,  in effect,  just a specific kind of metasemantic proposal on her 
view. 
2.3 Some Consequences for Future Theorizing
I  ask again:  what  positive claim does the naïve realist  endorse that  the intentionalist 
cannot?  I  confess  that  I  find  nothing.  Every  core  naïve  realist  claim  admits  of 
intentionalist  precisification.  For this reason, the intentionalist––I suspect––could very 
well be a naïve realist if she pleased. 
This has at least two upshots.
First upshot: An argument for naïve realism is not ipso facto an argument against 
intentionalism.  Suppose  that  I  gave  an  epistemic  argument  for,  say,  factivity.  The 
argument is that only by endorsing factivity can we avoid a certain sort of external world 
skepticism. Suppose that  I  have the experience that  I  typically do upon seeing a red 
rectangle. In fact, I do see a red rectangle––call it ‘r’––and it is red and rectangular. So, 
the experience is veridical. Seemingly, when I have such an experience, I am in a position 
to know  that  there exists  a  red,  rectangular  thing.  Moreover,  I  am in such a position 
precisely because I have the experience I do. How does my experience put me in such a 
position? The naïve realist has a plausible story. According to him, my experience “makes 
that knowledge available by making present to [me] a state of affairs consisting in there 
being  something  red  and  rectangular”  (McDowell,  2013:  144-5).  That  is,  it  makes 
knowledge possible  because in  having the experience I  bear  a  factive relation to  the 
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relevant state of affairs. Indeed, the mere existence of my experience entails that the state 
of affairs obtains. If so, then my experience looks as strong a piece of evidence as I can 
get for the existence of a red, rectangular thing. No such story is (plausibly) available on 
other  views.  Hence,  we ought  to  accept  naïve realism.  But  note:  even if  this  is  an 25
argument  for  factivity,  and  hence  for  naïve  realism,  it  is  not  an  argument  against 
intentionalism. Factivity admits of an intentionalist precisification. 
Second upshot:  There  is  a  version  of  intentionalism that  closely  emulates  naïve 
realism. In effect, it simply conjoins intentionalism with a naïve realist metasemantics 
and holds that EX-ed propositions are fine-grained propositions. Intentionalism and naïve 
realism are, in this way, compatible. 
However, I want to point out that my story about their compatibility differs from the 
norm. The typical story is that intentionalism and naïve realism may be reconciled once 
we divide up the explanatory tasks of a theory of perceptual experience and then assign 
some of those tasks to the intentionalist and others to the naïve realist. Heather Logue 
provides a clear example of this sort of strategy, writing that:
a philosophical theory of perceptual experience has several explanatory 
tasks:  in  particular,  it  is  supposed  to  explain  the  epistemological, 
behavioral,  and  phenomenological  aspects  of  experience.  Thus  it  is  in 
principle  possible  to  divide  the  labor  across  Naïve  Realism  and 
[Intentionalism]:  say,  the  latter  explains  the  epistemological  role  of 
experience  while  the  former  yields  an  account  of  the  phenomenal 
Let me make it clear: I do not endorse this argument. 25
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character of experience and the role it plays in facilitating action… (2014: 
237)
Logue’s  idea  is  that  if  we  assign  the  parties  different  aspects  of  experience  as  their 
explanatory targets, then their theories will not conflict. The intentionalist accounts for 
some aspects of experience and the naïve realist accounts for others. 
This is a sort of trivial reconciliation. If we assign the views distinct explanatory 
tasks  it’s  no  wonder  that  they  end  up  being  compatible.  This  division,  I  think,  is 
unnecessary. My strategy for reconciliation is merely to show that, in truth, there’s no 
deep incompatibility  between intentionalism and naïve realism in the first  place.  The 
intentionalist  and naïve realist  may jointly build a single theory––one that withstands 
scrutiny from both sides.  26
 Some naïve realists  may actually agree with me on this  matter.  Harold Langsam, for  example, 26
writes that “reflection on the phenomenal character of experience suggests a naïve realist view of 
the ontological  nature  of  experience,  for  it  suggests  that  an experience is  a  relation between a 
subject and an external object” (2016: 6). But he immediately qualifies this by saying that:
We use various terms to refer to this relation: I am aware of the tomato, I am 
conscious of the tomato, the tomato is present to me, the tomato is appearing to 
me,  the  tomato  is  before  my  mind.  None  of  these  terms  tells  us  anything 
additional about the relation; they are just labels for referring to that relation that 
has already been identified, the relation that enables the properties of the object 
perceived to figure in the phenomenal character of the experience. (ibid)
He then goes on in a footnote to say that this relation could, for all he has said, be “in part, a 
representational relation” (ibid, fn. 11). On this view, some version of intentionalism might be a 
form of naïve realism. But otherwise, I think naïve realism has been advertised falsely. It is not 
really a competitor to intentionalism at all. At worst, the intentionalist can simply think of naïve 
realism as a fringe variety of intentionalism. But fringe varieties of intentionalism are still varieties 
of intentionalism. 
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3. THE REPRESENTATIONAL LIMITS OF PERCEPTION
Wittgenstein  (in)famously  claimed  that  language  has  expressive  or  representational 
limits. According to him, the only things we may express in language––the only things 
that we may say––are “propositions of natural science” (1922, 6.53). Everything else is 
linguistically “inexpressible” (ibid, 6.522). His view, I doubt I need to argue, is mistaken. 
Surely we can express more than this. Surely this is not all there is to be said. 
Still,  even  if  one  disagrees  with  Wittgenstein  about  the  limits  of  language, 
representational  kinds  do  often  have  representational  limits.  Consider,  for  example, 
pictorial representation. Fred Dretske observes that although:
I can say that A and B are of different size without saying how much they 
differ in size or which is larger… I cannot picture A and B as being of 
different  size  without  picturing  one  of  them  as  larger  and  indicating, 
roughly, how much larger it is. (1981, 137)
The idea is that, in pictorial representation, certain features cannot be representationally 
isolated.  If one pictorially represents that a cube and sphere differ in size, one must also 27
pictorially  represent  which  of  the  two  is  larger.  There’s  simply  no  way  around  it. 
However, this is false of linguistic representation. It is obviously possible to linguistically 
represent that a cube and sphere differ in size without linguistically representing which is 
larger.  (Witness  any  instance  of  the  sentence  ‘the  cube  is  not  the  same  size  as  the 
There are,  in fact,  many kinds of pictorial  representation,  but  I  am simplifying for the sake of 27
illustration. For more on various pictorial and iconic systems of representation, see Giardino and 
Greenberg (2015) and Greenberg (2013).
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sphere’.)  In  this  sense,  the  two  representational  kinds––pictorial  representation  and 
linguistic representation––differ in their representational limits.
I  take  it  that  this  sort  of  phenomenon  will  be  relatively  familiar.  However  my 
concern  here  is  not  with  the  representational  limits  of  pictures  or  language.  I  am 
interested  in  the  representational  limits  of  perception  or,  more  precisely,  perceptual 
experience.  For  although  many  think  that  perceptual  experience  has  representational 
aspects––indeed,  many  think  that,  in  some  sense,  it  has  them essentially––few have 
considered  whether  it  has  representational  limits  and,  if  so,  what  its  representational 
limits might be.  My goal here will  be to focus on certain properties that perceptual 28
experiences cannot representationally isolate and show how this phenomenon bears on 
theories of perceptual experience. Specifically, I will show how these limits constrain and 
even cut short certain attempts to reduce perceptual experience to naturalistic ingredients.
Here’s  a  roadmap.  First,  I  will  discuss  the  role  that  representation  plays  in 
contemporary attempts to ‘reduce’ perceptual experience (Sect. 1). Next, I will make a 
case that, given this role, perceptual experiences cannot representationally isolate a range 
of properties, though the properties that will concern me most will be color properties 
(Sect.  2).  Then,  I  will  show how this  causes trouble for certain reductive theories of 
perceptual experience (Sect. 3). Finally, I will consider a number of objections to my 
arguments  and,  in  doing  so,  gesture  at  how  we  ought  to  proceed  in  light  of  the 
representational limits of perception (Sect. 4). 
Some have discussed these  limits.  For  example,  see  Adam Pautz  (2016,  forthcoming)  and Jeff 28
Speaks  (forthcoming).  Suggestive  remarks  are  made  in  passing  by  Brian  Cutter  (2016),  Mark 
Johnston (n.d.), and Colin McGinn (1983).
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3.1 Phenomenal Representation and Bridging the Explanatory Gap
The latter portion of the 20th Century witnessed what we might call the Intentionalist 
Revolution in the philosophy of mind. Philosophers, emboldened by several promising 
book-length  projects,  began  to  think  that  there  was  an  essential  connection  between 
which  qualities  phenomenally  characterize  an  experience  and  what  that  experience 
represents.  The idea is straightforward enough. Suppose that you are looking at a red 29
ball  and  undergoing  a  visual  experience.  As  you  have  this  experience,  a  number  of 
qualities  will  be  immediately  present  to  you––intuitively,  and  among  other  things,  a 
number  of  colors  and  shapes,  most  saliently  redness  and  roundness.  These  qualities 
characterize what it is like for you to have the experience of seeing a red ball in the sense 
that any complete description of what it is like for you to have the experience would have 
to  appeal  to  them.  In  this  sense,  they  phenomenally  characterize  your  experience. 
However,  there is  also a  strong intuition that  your  experience represents  redness and 
roundness as qualities of the ball. Your experience ‘says’ that the ball is red and round. 
And if what it is says is not so, then it misleads you, and you are subject to a perceptual 
illusion.
Members  of  the  Intentionalist  Revolution––intentionalists––hold  that  this  is  no 
coincidence.  There  is  some intimate  connection  between which  qualities  characterize 
your  experiences  and  which  qualities  your  experiences  represent.  The  most  obvious 
connection is identity:
I have in mind Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1995). 29
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Intentionalism: There is a unique representational kind K such that, for 
any quality Q, being phenomenally characterized by Q is identical with K-
ly representing Q.30
What exactly is meant by ‘represent’ here? And what is a representational kind? We can 
rely  on  commonsense  examples  of  representation  as  a  guide.  Utterances,  sentences, 
words, maps, pictures, diagrams, paintings, thermometers, speedometers––all these things 
have representational features. A painting, for example, may represent a certain scene; a 
speedometer may represent the speed of a car; a sentence may represent a state of affairs. 
However, the way in which a painting represents a scene and a sentence a state of affairs 
are distinct in kind. Paintings represent scenes pictorially  whereas sentences represent 
states  of  affairs  linguistically.  With  these  examples  in  mind,  let  us  call  the 
representational kind that satisfies the conditions specified by intentionalism phenomenal 
representation. The intentionalist’s idea is that what it is for a quality to phenomenally 
characterize  your  experience  is  for  your  experience  to  phenomenally  represent  that 
quality. 
Intentionalism, though popular, is still controversial. But there are good reasons to 
accept the view and, if not accept it, then take the possibility of its truth very seriously. 
One prominent  reason is  its  seemingly  unique  ability  to  offer  a  straightforward  path 
across the explanatory gap––one of the most prominent obstacles to a naturalistic theory 
of consciousness.  The thought: It  is independently plausible that intentionality can be 
See Byrne (2009), Cutter (2018), Dretske (1995, 2003), Hill (2009), Jackson (2004), Levine (2010), 30
Pautz  (2016),  Thau  (2002)  and  Tye  (1995,  2000,  2002,  2009,  2014)  for  this  variety  of 
intentionalism. Though I work with an identity thesis, a necessarily true biconditional would work 
for  my  purposes  here  (e.g.  necessarily,  something  is  phenomenally  characterized  by  Q  iff  it 
phenomenally represents Q).
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reduced  to  some  complex  of  naturalistically  acceptable  ingredients.  But  if 
phenomenology reduces to a kind of intentionality, then it seems that phenomenology can 
be reduced to naturalistically acceptable ingredients as well. What this does, in effect, is 
break  a  ‘hard  problem’  into  two  ‘easy  problems’.  We  have  trouble  seeing  how 
phenomenology could––in one fell swoop––reduce to something physical. However, we 
do not have anywhere near as much trouble seeing how phenomenology could reduce to 
something intentional. After all, most of the arguments for intentionalism are (broadly 
speaking) a priori. Relatedly––though constructing such an account is hard––we do not 
have  any  in  principle  difficulty  in  seeing  how  intentionality  or  representation  could 
reduce  to  something  physical.  So  although  we  cannot  see  how  to  get  across  the 
explanatory gap all at once, reductive intentionalism shows us that we can see how to get 
across two smaller gaps that, once crossed, allow us to cross the explanatory gap. 
The idea might be precisified as follows: the relation of phenomenal representation 
can be identified with some physical, functional, or computational relation of some sort. 
Reductive  intentionalism:  Intentionalism  is  true  and  phenomenally 
representing a quality is identical with bearing some physical, functional, 
or computational relation to that quality.31
Why work with identity rather than, say, ground? To be clear, grounding is (likely) an 
irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive relation that may hold between entities of different 
ontological categories (e.g. between facts and objects,  properties and events,  states of 
affairs and dispositions, etc.). I think we have a decent pre-theoretic grasp of this relation. 
For example, it is the salient relation that the members of a set bear to the existence of the 
See  Dretske  (1995),  Lycan  (1996),  and  Tye  (1995,  2000,  2009)  for  reductive  varieties  of 31
intentionalism. I’m assuming here that the relevant qualities can also be reduced, of course.
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set itself, that the molecular structure of a mug bears to the mug’s fragility, that the truth 
of a disjunct bears to the truth of a disjunction, and so on. Its converse is the relation of 
(metaphysical)  dependence.  The  existence  of  a  set  depends  on  the  existence  of  its 
members, the mug’s fragility depends on its molecular structure, the truth of a disjunction 
depends on the truth of one or more of its disjuncts, and so on. I do not work with ground 
because  it  seems  to  me that  it  is  not  the  right  tool  to  articulate  theses  that  concern 
reduction. When we look to reduce x to y, what we aim to do––in some sense––is show 
that x is ‘nothing over an above’ y. Grounding does a poor job of capturing this intuitive 
thought. Consider a metaethical example. I might take it that actions are good in virtue of 
promoting happiness––an action’s goodness is grounded in its promoting happiness. But I 
have  not  thereby  reduced  goodness  to  promoting  happiness.  I  have  not  said  that  an 
action’s goodness is ‘nothing over and above’ its promoting happiness. So, grounding 
does not seem the right tool to articulate reductive theses. Identity, however, does. If I had 
identified goodness with promoting happiness, then it seems I would have in some sense 
reduced the former to the latter. Goodness would be, on such a view, ‘nothing over and 
above’ promoting happiness.
The crucial question for the reductive intentionalist, of course, is which  physical, 
functional,  or  computational  relation  should  feature  in  her  theory.  There  are  several 
options here.  However, many agree that the most plausible theories are teleosemantic––32
they  incorporate  the  notion  of  function  (or  telos)  in  order  to  reduce  phenomenal 
representation. The differences between distinct teleosemantic theories are subtle. But of 
See Pautz 2010b for a detailed summary of these options. 32
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the available theories of this sort, one stands out as most plausible: Fred Dretske's teleo-
intentionalism.33
Teleo-intentionalism:  Intentionalism  is  true  and  phenomenally 
representing a quality is identical with playing the cognitive-input role and 
having the biological function of indicating instantiations of that quality. 
(Dretske, 1995)
Let’s unpack the key terms: ‘cognitive-input role’, ‘biological function’, and ‘indicating’. 
The cognitive-input role  is  a  functional  property that  is  had by an internal  state of  a 
subject––plausibly, at least in humans, a neural state of some kind––just in case that state 
is of a kind that is typically an output of a perceptual system and typically provides input 
to the cognitive system in order to regulate thought and behavior (ibid, 19). Indication is 
meant to be a familiar notion that we can get a grip on through examples. To use some of 
Dretske’s favorites: the presence of smoke indicates fire; rolling storm clouds indicate 
rain; and the rings on a tree indicate its age. However, the notion of biological function is 
a bit trickier. Some examples are ready to hand: the (or a) biological function of the heart 
is to pump blood, the biological function of the lung is to extract oxygen from the air and 
transport it to the bloodstream, the biological function of a molar is to crush and grind 
food, etc. Still, to get a better handle on the theory, we should like to say a bit more about 
what the relevant biological functions are and in virtue of what something has a given 
biological function.
According to Dretske, where phenomenal representation is concerned, the relevant 
biological  functions  are  systemic.  That  is,  they are  biological  functions  possessed by 
Indeed, even Tye (in conversation) now favors this theory over the theories he advocated in Tye 33
(1995, 2000). 
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certain  internal  states  of  subjects  that  derive  from  the  biological  functions  of  the 
perceptual systems that generate those states (ibid, 15). On this view, a perceptual system 
first comes to have the biological function of indicating some determinable property (like 
color or shape), and then internal states generated by the system derivatively come to 
have the  biological  function of  indicating determinates  of  the  relevant  property  (like 
determinate colors or determinate shapes). How does a perceptual system come to have 
such a function? Plausibly, via its evolutionary history.  Dretske "happens to favor the 
account  of  biological  functions  described  by  Godfrey-Smith  1994"  (ibid,  169:  fn4). 
Dretske  is  referring  to  Peter  Godfrey-Smith’s  modern  history  theory  of  biological 
function. Put roughly, the modern history theory has it that the biological functions of x 
are  determined  by  the  features/facts  in  virtue  of  which  (recent)  selection  pressures 
favored creatures with x. Specifically, x has G as a biological function in virtue of the fact 
that,  in  recent  history,  x’s  exhibiting  G  (under  certain  conditions)  at  least  partially 
explains the fitness of organisms with x.
Putting  this  all  together,  we  get  something  like  the  following  picture.  For 
concreteness, consider the human visual system. Part of the explanation of why having a 
visual system is adaptive is that,  under environmentally normal conditions, the visual 
system indicates instantiations of color properties. Because the visual system’s having 
this feature is adaptive, the visual system has the biological function of indicating the 
instantiation of color. Derivatively, states generated by this system have the biological 
function  of  indicating  the  instantiations  of  (relatively)  determinate  colors.  So,  for 
example, some states have the biological function of indicating redness whereas others 
have  the  biological  function  of  indicating  blueness.  This,  according  to  teleo-
intentionalism, means that various states of the visual system––provided they play the 
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cognitive-input  role––will  phenomenally  represent  color  properties  like  redness  and 
blueness.
Here’s where we are. We now have a representational kind in view––phenomenal 
representation. If this representational kind can be reduced, as the reductive intentionalist 
thinks it can, then we have a successful, naturalistic theory of perceptual phenomenology. 
What I want to suggest,  however, is that the plausibility of this strategy––indeed, the 
plausibility of the entire reductive intentionalist research program––runs up against the 
limits  of  phenomenal  representation.  To  see  why,  I  will  need  to  make  a  case  that 
phenomenal representation has limits. 
3.2 Phenomenal Isolation
We can all make sense of the idea of an experience ‘as of’ something red and round, or an 
experience as of something loud and far away. In fact, we can even make sense of certain 
experiences that are beyond our ken. For example, it seems (metaphysically) possible for 
there to be a creature that experiences more than three spatial dimensions––perhaps a 
creature that has experiences as of hypercubes, hyperrectangles, hyperspheres, and so on. 
Of course, we cannot have (or even imagine what it is like to have) these experiences. 
Still, they strike us as prima facie coherent––at least I can’t see any reason why they 
wouldn’t  be  possible.  But,  crucially,  some descriptions  of  perceptual  experiences  are 
prima facie incoherent. If Lily the neuroscientist tells us that she has found a creature that 
has experiences as of round cubes, we will rightly regard Lily as confused. Perhaps the 
creature is having an experience as of something that is round and simultaneously having 
another experience as of something that is cube-shaped (perhaps one experience is visual 
and the other is tactile). But the suggestion that it has a single, unimodal experience as of 
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a round cube seems wrong. That is not an experience that any possible creature could 
have. And it is not just that we cannot imagine what it is like to have such an experience. 
Rather, it is that such an experience seems positively impossible. 
Relatedly,  certain  experiences  are  impossible  because certain  qualities  cannot  be 
phenomenally  isolated  in  perceptual  experience––necessarily,  if  they  phenomenally 
characterize  an  experience  at  all,  then  other  qualities  must  also  phenomenally 
characterize that experience. Suppose Lily now tells us that she has discovered a creature 
that experiences color but not space. We would likely give her an incredulous stare. Is the 
claim that  the  creature  experiences  colors  but  does  not  experience  them as  spatially 
extended or located? Is it that the creature has an experience as of a colored thing that is 
not an experience as of a spatial thing? I confess: I cannot make sense of either claim. 
Again,  it  is  not  just  that  I  cannot  imagine  what  it  would  be  like  to  have  such  an 
experience. Rather, it is that these descriptions strike me as incoherent. Color seems to be 
the sort of thing that cannot be phenomenally isolated: any color experience would also 
have to be, in some way or another, a spatial experience. Just to drive this point home, I 
invite  you  to  bring  a  red  item before  you.  Attend  to  the  redness  that  phenomenally 
characterizes  your  experience  and  ask  yourself  the  following  question:  would  it  be 
possible for a subject to experience this very quality and yet fail to have an experience 
that is in any way spatial? Intuitively, no. If you subtract all spatial elements from an 
experience's character, then you subtract all redness––and indeed any color whatsoever––
as  well.  Necessarily,  any  experience  phenomenally  characterized  by  a  color  property 
must also be phenomenally characterized by a spatial property.
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This example isn’t anomalous. Color is just one example of a property that cannot 
be phenomenally isolated,  and there seem a number of other qualities that  cannot be 
isolated in this way. Offhand, all of the following strike me as plausible.
1. No shape without location. It is impossible for a shape property to phenomenally 
characterize an experience without a location property phenomenally 
characterizing that experience.
2.  No pitch without volume. It is impossible for a pitch property to phenomenally 
characterize an experience without a volume property phenomenally 
characterizing that experience.
3. No motion without time. It is impossible for a motion property to phenomenally 
characterize an experience without a temporal property phenomenally 
characterizing that experience.
4. No pain without space. It is impossible for a pain property to phenomenally 
characterize an experience without a spatial property phenomenally 
characterizing that experience.
Shape,  pitch,  motion,  pain––none  of  these  features  can  be  phenomenally  isolated. 
Whenever  you find an  experience  whose  phenomenology is  characterized  by  (say)  a 
motion property, you also find an experience whose phenomenology is characterized by a 
temporal property. Similarly, whenever you find an experience whose phenomenology is 
characterized  by  a  pain  property,  you  find  an  experience  whose  phenomenology  is 
characterized by some spatial property––e.g. a spatial location property.
Now,  here’s  the  important  point.  If  it  is  true  that  these  properties  cannot  be 
phenomenally  isolated,  then  they  also  cannot  be  representationally  isolated  by  a 
perceptual experience, at least where phenomenal representation is concerned. For given 
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that  being  phenomenally  characterized  by  a  quality  is  identical  with  phenomenally 
representing it, this means that perceptual experiences must have representational limits. 
Consider  the  connection  between  color  and  spatial  experience:  necessarily,  being 
phenomenally  characterized  by  a  color  property  requires  being  phenomenally 
characterized by a spatial property. If intentionalism is true, then being phenomenally 
characterized by a color property is  identical  with phenomenally representing a color 
property. Relatedly, being phenomenally characterized by a spatial property is identical 
with phenomenally representing a  spatial  property.  By substitution,  we get  a  limit  of 
phenomenal representation:
Necessarily,  phenomenally  representing  a  color  property  requires 
phenomenally representing a spatial property.
This  means  that,  in  phenomenal  representation,  color  cannot  be  representationally 
isolated.  In  fact,  per  the  list  given  above,  phenomenal  representation  cannot 
representationally isolate a number of properties: shape is coupled with location, pitch 
with  volume,  motion  with  time,  and  pain  with  space.  These  are  among  the 
representational limits of perceptual experience. (And note: even if you grant that some 
properties,  but  not  the  ones  I  have  listed,  cannot  be  phenomenally  isolated,  then 
phenomenal  representation  will  still  have  representational  limits.  They  will  just  be 
different from the ones that I have given.) 
I want to be clear: I am not merely making a claim about creatures like us. That is, I 
am not merely saying that humans or humanlike creatures cannot phenomenally isolate 
certain properties. I am claiming it is flat-out metaphysically impossible to phenomenally 
isolate these qualities and, correspondingly, that it is metaphysically impossible to isolate 
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the qualities in phenomenal representation. I don’t take this to be a brute modal fact. 
Rather, it is somehow in the nature of phenomenal characterization that it is impossible 
for certain properties to be phenomenally isolated. There is something about the essence 
of phenomenal characterization itself that grounds or explains the modal facts. Exactly 
what it is about its essence that grounds such facts is hard to say. But it seems to me that, 
for quite general reasons, there must be a pre-modal explanation of this sort. 
At any rate, I highlight the point since one might worry that such experiences are not 
impossible. Rather it is just that we cannot imagine what it is like to have them––that is, 
we cannot imagine what it is like to phenomenally isolate these properties. The thought 
seems to be that our belief that these experiences are impossible is  explained by our 
inability to imagine them. In the case of color, for example, one might object that the 
mere fact that we cannot imagine what it is like to have an experience that phenomenally 
isolates color leads us to mistakenly believe that such an experience is impossible. 
Of course, I grant that it is true that we cannot imagine what it is like to have such an 
experience. But this failure is not itself a very plausible explanation of why one might 
believe it  is  impossible to phenomenally isolate color.  As I  said previously,  we often 
recognize that certain experiences are beyond our ken without thereby regarding them as 
impossible. Consider again the (merely possible) creature who experiences hypercubes. 
We cannot experience this shape and, moreover, cannot imagine what it is like to have 
such an experience. But our failure of imagination does not confuse us into thinking that 
such experiences are impossible. To give another example, bats and dolphins––owing to 
their  capacity  for  echolocation––likely  have  experiences  that  put  together  sound  and 
space in ways that we cannot imagine. Most of us do not know, and will never know, 
what it is like to be either of these creatures. To that extent, we cannot imagine what it is 
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like to have their experiences. Still, our inability to imagine what bat-experiences and 
dolphin-experiences are like does not lead us to think that they are impossible. The point 
is that, in general, the mere fact that we cannot imagine what it is like to have certain 
experiences does not lead us to believe that those experiences are impossible. It is not, 
therefore, a plausible explanation of why we think experiences that phenomenally isolate 
color are impossible.
A rather different sort of objection might be this. Color and space are constantly co-
present  in  our  experiences.  We then,  in  Humean  terminology,  confuse  their  constant 
conjunction  for  a  necessary  connection.  But  really,  there  is  no  necessary  connection 
between them at all. 
This objection is odd. On the face of it, it takes something that is evidence for the 
necessary connection between color and space in experience and tries to convert it into a 
piece of evidence against it. How so? If there were a necessary connection between color 
and space in this way, what we would expect is that the former cannot be separated from 
the latter in our experience. At any rate, perhaps objection is this: we think the necessary 
connection holds merely because of the constant co-presence of color and space in our 
experiences, but this is insufficient evidence for the claim. I stress that, in my own case, 
this is not my evidence for believing that there is a necessary connection at all. Rather, 
my evidence  for  thinking  that  there  is  a  necessary  connection  is  something  like  the 
appearance of  impossibility.  Consider  an analogy.  I  think that  violations of  Leibniz’s 
Law––roughly, the principle that necessarily, if x  and y  differ in their properties (at a 
time), then they are distinct––are impossible. It is impossible for a pair of individuals x 
and y to be such that x and y differ in their properties (at a time), and yet x = y. What is 
my justification for accepting that this is impossible? Well, it just seems impossible. My 
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justification runs no deeper than this. But that it seems impossible provides me with at 
least some defeasible justification for thinking that it is impossible. Moreover, given the 
strength of the seeming and the absence of sufficiently strong defeaters, I contend that my 
justification is, as some would put it, all-out––I am justified in believing that violations of 
Leibniz’s Law are impossible. Similarly, my justification for thinking that certain sorts of 
experiences are impossible is just that they seem impossible. Again, given the strength of 
the seeming and absence of sufficiently strong countervailing reasons, I may rationally 
accept their impossibility as well.34
Instead of challenging the grounds for accepting that there is a necessary connection 
between  color  and  space––or  any  pair  of  qualities––in  experience,  one  might  try  to 
directly challenge the claim itself. 
First,  one might push back on the generality of some of the proposed necessary 
connections.  For  example,  some (like Jeff  Speaks (forthcoming))  might  hold that  the 
necessary  connection  between  color  experience  and  spatial  experience  is  modality 
specific.  It  holds  of  visual  experiences,  but  does  not  hold  of  perceptual  experiences 
generally. It is hard to properly address this challenge without giving a full-blown theory 
of how one ought to individuate the various sense modalities––something that is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. Accordingly, I cannot hope to give a complete reply here. 
However,  I  can  give  a  partial  reply  based  on  my  preferred  theory  of  modality 
individuation.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  senses  are  to  be  individuated  in  a  ‘quasi-
Aristotelean’ fashion.  That  is,  what  individuates  the  senses  are  the  properties  with 35
I  am, of  course,  appealing to a  version of  the principal  of  phenomenal  conservatism here.  See 34
Huemer 2007. 
For an overview of the theoretical terrain on modality individuation, see Macpherson 2011.35
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which  they  acquaint  us  or,  equivalently,  which  properties  phenomenally  characterize 
experiences  generated  by  the  relevant  sensory  system.  In  other  words,  each  sense  is 
associated with a characteristic set of properties and is individuated thereby. In the case 
of vision, I think that the characteristic properties are color properties. So, on my view, 
the answer is that, somewhat trivially, the claims I am making do apply only to visual 
experience. But this does not introduce any significant complications. 
Alternatively, and focusing again on the example of color,  one might object that 
there are actual counterexamples to the principle. Perhaps chromesthesia––a specific kind 
of synesthesia––shows that we may sever the alleged necessary connection between color 
experiences and spatial experiences. Very roughly, chromesthesia occurs in subjects that 
have  color  experiences  that  are  triggered  by  auditory  stimulation.  When  discussing 
chromesthesia loosely, we often say things to the effect that chromesthetic subjects ‘hear 
colors’. Speaking this way might suggest that they are having auditory experiences of 
color but, perhaps, these auditory experiences are non-spatial experiences. 
This  is  unconvincing.  First,  there  is  something  slightly  misleading  about  the 
description  of  chromesthetic  individuals  as  ‘hearing  color’.  A typical  description  of 
synesthesia is that:  "a stimulus presented in one modality triggers imagery in another 
modality" (Baron-Cohen et al 1987: 761). If anything, this suggests that, in the case of 
chromesthesia,  subjects  are  not  having  an  auditory  experience  of  color.  Rather,  an 
auditory stimulus triggers an ordinary color experience i.e. one that we would readily call 
visual.  At  any  rate,  whatever  modality  these  experiences  belong  to,  I  know  of  no 
chromesthetic  subject  that  reports  having  a  color  experience  that  is  not  a  spatial 
experience. Quite the opposite. According to their reports, "colored shapes are said to 
appear,  scintillate,  and  move  around,  then  fade  away  only  to  be  replaced  by  a 
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kaleidoscopic  montage  of  colored  photisms  so  long  as  the  varying  sound  stimulus 
continues"  (Cytowic  and  Eagleman,  2009:  39).  This,  to  my  ear,  sounds  like  the 
description of a spatial experience. The bottom line is that there seems no good evidence 
that  chromesthesia  severs  the  necessary  connection  between  color  and  space  in 
experience.
That phenomenal representation is limited in these ways should not surprise us. As 
discussed in the introduction, the inability to isolate certain features is relatively common 
among more familiar kinds of representation. Recall that pictorial representation seems 
incapable of representationally isolating size differences. If one pictorially represents that 
two things differ in size, then one must also pictorially represent that one of those things 
is larger than the other. Another well-known example comes from Euler diagrams. In 
Euler-diagrammatic representation, circles represent sets and spatial overlap between two 
circles represents that the sets have a non-empty intersection. This has the result that if a 
Euler  diagram  represents  that  any  three  of  a  group  of  four  sets  has  a  non-empty 
intersection, then it must also represent that all four sets have a non-empty intersection. 
Why? Because it is provable that (roughly) if any three of four shapes partially overlap, 
then all four shapes overlap.  36
3.3 A New Problem for Reductive Intentionalism
And now we run into our problem. If phenomenal representation has the limits I have 
argued it does, then teleo-intentionalism must be false, for it simply fails to respect these 
limits.  To  illustrate,  I  will  focus  on  the  coupling  of  color  and  space  in  phenomenal 
representation. The problem can be put in the form of an argument:
See Shin, Lemon, and Mumma 2013: section 2 for a detailed explanation.36
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P1. It is impossible for an experience to phenomenally represent a color 
property and not phenomenally represent a spatial property.
P2. If teleo-intentionalism is true, then it is possible for an experience to 
phenomenally represent a color property and not phenomenally represent a 
spatial property.
C. So teleo-intentionalism is false.
I am going to take it for granted that, given the remarks in the last section, it is reasonable 
to accept P1. This means the only premise that needs defense is P2.
Now, the justification for P2 is primarily that a perceptual system can quite easily 
come to have the biological function of indicating color properties without coming to 
have  the  biological  function  of  indicating  spatial  properties.  For,  on  the  teleo-
intentionalist model, perceptual systems are much like representational instruments fine-
tuned by Mother Nature, and Mother Nature could have easily designed an instrument 
whose sole function was to indicate the presence of color. 
To see why, consider an Earth-like planet in a world much like our own. On this 
planet––Planet Birch––there is a population of intelligent, human-like creatures that we 
may call Treeple. Like us, Treeple have an interesting collection of intentional states, they 
reason,  they  exhibit  complex  behavior,  they  have  families  and  social  groups,  etc. 
However, unlike us, Treeple are mostly immobile and grow out of the ground. When 
mature, they reach staggering heights and develop leaf-like appendages on their branch-
like arms. But life on Planet Birch is harsh. There are two suns––one red and one blue. 
When the blue sun is  out,  it  turns the normally red skies of planet Birch purple and 
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produces a light far too harsh for the delicate leaves of Treeple. Thankfully, Treeple have 
evolved to  accommodate  this.  Over  millions  of  years  of  evolution,  they developed a 
perceptual  system that  serves  as  a  simple  colorimeter.  This  system produces  various 
internal states each of which (under normal conditions) indicates the instantiation of some 
unique color property. Unsurprisingly, the system's indicating the instantiation of color 
made Treeple with this perceptual system more evolutionarily fit. As a result, the system 
came to have the biological function of indicating color. Derivatively, states produced by 
this system came to have the biological function of indicating various determinate colors 
and, in particular, states of kind K came to have the biological function of indicating 
instantiations of purple.
Consider now a specific Tree-person named Douglas. On this particular occasion, 
Douglas finds himself beneath a purple sky. As the light from the sky strikes his leaves, 
he tokens a state of kind K and, as is typical of K-states in Treeple, it plays the cognitive-
input role. In light of this, Douglas is able to take evasive action––he rolls up his leaves 
and alerts members of his community to the impending danger.
Here  is  the  problem.  Douglas's  K-state  has  the  following  features:  (1)  its  sole 
biological function is to indicate instantiations of purple and (2) it plays the cognitive-
input  role.  This  means  that,  if  teleo-intentionalism  is  true,  then  Douglas's  K-state 
phenomenally  represents  purple  and  nothing  else.  For  on  teleo-intentionalism,  the 
property  of  phenomenally  representing  a  quality  Q  is  identical  with  the  property  of 
playing  the  cognitive-input  role  and  having  the  biological  function  of  indicating 
instantiations  of  Q.  Douglas's  K-state  has  only  one  biological  function:  to  indicate 
instantiations of purple. Hence, by the lights of teleo-intentionalism, there can be only 
one  thing  it  phenomenally  represents,  namely,  the  color  purple.  However,  as  I  have 
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argued, no state of any possible subject can phenomenally represent color in isolation. It 
is  a  necessary  truth  that  phenomenally  representing  a  color  property  requires 
phenomenally representing a spatial property. Teleo-intentionalism predicts otherwise. It 
allows  for  color  to  be  phenomenally  represented  in  isolation.  It  must  therefore  be 
rejected.
3.4 Objections
Let me now consider some objections to the preceding argument. Most will consist in 
ways of denying P2. 
3.4.1 TREEPLE ARE IMPOSSIBLE
Objection.  It’s  false  that  the  sole  biological  function  of  K-states  is  to  indicate 
instantiations of purple. Why? Because Douglas's K-state must also have the biological 
function of  indicating that  purple  is  instantiated nearby  or  around  .  What  makes the 
perceptual  systems  of  Treeple  adaptive  is  that  they  indicate  a  determinable  complex 
property  of  being  colored  and  spatially  located.  This  is  because,  in  Treeple's  recent 
evolutionary history, their perceptual system's indicating the instantiation of the property 
being  colored  & around  explains  the  fitness  of  Treeple  with  this  perceptual  system. 
Hence,  the  teleo-intentionalist  will  predict  that  Douglas's  K-state  has  the  biological 
function of indicating the property being purple & nearby––a (partially) spatial property. 
If so, the view can, after all, accommodate the limits of phenomenal representation.
Reply. My response to this is twofold. First, I want to register the fact that––though I 
am sympathetic to this line of reasoning––I am not convinced that the perceptual systems 
of Treeple must have the biological function of indicating instantiations of the property 
being colored and spatially located. I agree that there is a possible evolutionary history of 
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Treeple  (or  creatures  like  them)  where  their  perceptual  systems  have  the  biological 
function of indicating both color properties and location properties. But I am doubtful 
that it is the only possible evolutionary history of these creatures. That is, it seems clear 
to me that it  is  metaphysically possible that it  is  merely their systems’ indicating the 
instantiation of color properties that made them adaptive. But metaphysical possibility is 
all my argument requires. To that extent, it seems to me that there are possible creatures 
with perceptual systems whose sole biological function is to indicate color. If so, then 
there are possible creatures that, if teleo-intentionalism is true, phenomenally represent 
color but not space.
Second, I might be willing to grant the objector's point for the sake of argument 
since,  ultimately,  it  won’t  help  the  teleo-intentionalist.  It  is  not  just  that  there  is  a 
necessary connection between the experience of color and the experience of space. There 
is also a more specific necessary connection between the experience of color and the 
experience of spatial extension. As some might put it, it is a necessary truth that colors 
'show up’ in phenomenology as being extended or as belonging to things that are spatially 
extended. Once again, bring some red item before you and focus on the redness that 
phenomenally characterizes your experience. When you do this, you will find that the 
quality seems to take up space––it  seems spatially extended or spread out.  Now, ask 
yourself the following question: would it be possible for a subject to have an experience 
as  of  something  red  and  yet  fail  to  have  an  experience  as  of  something  spatially 
extended?  Intuitively,  no.  The  experiences  seem  bound  together  in  a  certain  way. 
Specifically,  an  experience  as  of  something  red  must  also  be  an  experience  as  of 
something spatially extended. If this is so, then, for familiar reasons, it is impossible for 
there to be an experience that phenomenally represents a color property but does not 
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phenomenally represent  an extension property––like being spatially  extended in some 
way W. The problem now becomes this. Even if it is plausible that the perceptual systems 
of Treeple must have the biological function of indicating spatial location, it is clear that 
they need not have the biological function of indicating spatial extension. More to the 
point, even if Douglas's K-state has the function of indicating that purple is instantiated 
nearby or around, it need not have the function of indicating (say) the rough shape of 
anything  at  all.  Accordingly,  by  the  lights  of  teleo-intentionalism,  it  does  not 
phenomenally represent an extension property even though it phenomenally represents a 
color property. But, given the necessary connection between the experience of color and 
the experience of extension, this cannot be so.
3.4.2 THE PROBLEM DOES NOT SPREAD
Objection.  Even if  teleo-intentionalism is  false,  the problem does not spread to other 
varieties  of  reductive  intentionalism.  Consider,  for  example,  the  causal  covariation 
intentionalism advocated by Michael Tye (1995, 2009). This theory has it that, roughly, a 
state's phenomenally representing a quality is identical with its playing the cognitive-
input  role  and  being  caused  by  instantiations  of  that  quality  under  (evolutionarily 
determined) optimal conditions. It is not immediately obvious that this view will have the 
problems of its  Dretskean cousin.  For there is  at  least  something to the thought that, 
necessarily, being caused by the instantiation of a color property requires being caused by 
the  instantiation  of  some  spatial  property.  If  this  is  so,  then  causal  covariation 
intentionalism does not allow for the phenomenal representation of color properties in 
isolation.
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Reply.  Whether  there  is  a  necessary  connection  between  being  caused  by  the 
instantiation of a color property and being caused by the instantiation of some spatial 
property is unclear. Imagine a machine with a color sensor and a pneumatic arm. The 
machine uses the color sensor to detect the colors of woodblocks and the pneumatic arm 
to sort them into bins. Suppose on one occasion the machine scans a red block and then 
places it in a bin labeled ‘RED’. Why did the machine sort the block as it did? Because 
the block was red. It was the instantiation of a color property that caused the machine to 
sort the block into the RED bin. But notice that it is not obvious that the block's shape or 
location is part of what caused the machine to sort the block as it did. To that extent, it is 
not  obvious  whether  there  is  a  necessary  connection  between  being  caused  by  the 
instantiation  of  a  color  property  and  being  caused  by  the  instantiation  of  a  spatial 
property. And if there is no necessary connection, then causal covariation intentionalism 
will fall in the same manner as its Dretskean counterpart: by allowing representational 
decoupling in ways that the limits of phenomenal representation forbid.
3.4.3 RAMSIFIED REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM ESCAPES THE ARGUMENT
Objection. The reductive intentionalist can simply make the following move. She might 
insist  that  there  is  a  version  of  reductive  intentionalism  that  respects  phenomenal 
representation’s limits. It is what we might call a ‘Ramsified’ reductive intentionalism:
Ramsified  reductive  intentionalism:  Intentionalism  is  true  and 
phenomenally  representing  a  quality  Q  is  identical  with  bearing  some 
relation R to Q such that (1) R is identical with some complex physical, 
functional,  or  computational  relation  and  (2)  R  respects  phenomenal 
representation's limits.
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The idea here is that we rely on the limits of phenomenal representation to pick out the 
relation that  the reductive intentionalist  should rely on in constructing her theory.  Of 
course,  this  makes  the  theory  trivially  compatible  with  phenomenal  representation's 
limits. 
Reply. There is something deeply unsatisfying about this view. Compare: Suppose I 
want  a  justified-true-belief  (JTB) account  of  knowledge that  is  not  subject  to  Gettier 
counterexamples. I could achieve such an account by saying that knowledge is justified, 
true,  un-Gettiered  belief.  This,  I  take  it,  would  not  be  an  adequate  JTB  theory  of 
knowledge. Though it might be extensionally adequate, it fails to explain––in terms of 
justification,  truth,  and/or  belief––why  subjects  lack  knowledge  in  Gettier  cases. 
Analogously,  though  Ramsified  reductive  intentionalism  accommodates  phenomenal 
representation's  limits,  it  does not  explain  in  broadly speaking naturalistic  terms why 
phenomenal representation has the limits it does.  37
3.4.4 PHENOMENAL REPRESENTATION IS PICTORIAL
Objection. Such an explanation can be given if we append to reductive intentionalism the 
thesis that phenomenal representation is (quasi)pictorial. 
Reductive pictorial intentionalism (RPI): (1) Intentionalism is true; (2) 
phenomenally  representing  a  quality  is  identical  with  bearing  some 
physical,  functional,  or  computational  relation  to  that  quality;  and  (3) 
phenomenal representation is a species of pictorial representation.
What does RPI amount to exactly? 
This, I take it, is one of the primary worries in Pautz (2016).37
 
 83
Pictorial  representation is not just  a matter of the format of representation being 
picture-like since not all representation done by pictures is pictorial representation. For 
example, a political cartoon might represent that Donald Trump is a poor choice for the 
Republican  nomination  by  showing  a  Trump  tower  collapsing  into  dust.  While  the 
cartoon represents that Donald Trump is a poor choice for the Republican nomination, it 
does not pictorially represent this state of affairs. As we might put it, the picture does not 
depict this state of affairs. What it depicts or pictorially represents is the collapsing of the 
Trump Tower. 
But once we have a grip on pictorial representation, we can see that it is limited in 
many of the ways that phenomenal representation is.  In particular,  it  is impossible to 
pictorially represent color properties without pictorially representing spatial properties. 
So, if true, RPI would explain by subsumption why phenomenal representation has the 
limits it does––it would explain its limits by subsuming them under some general rule or 
law about the limits of pictorial representation. That is, because it is a species of pictorial 
representation, it is impossible to phenomenally represent color without phenomenally 
representing space. Moreover, this would enable an explanation of why the case of the 
Treeple is impossible. 
Reply. Let me start with a quibble that will lead us into a more serious issue. It is 
worth noting that there is a tendency among philosophers of mind to speak as if there is 
just  one  kind of pictorial  representation.  But this  is  not  so.  There are many kinds of 
pictorial representation just as there are many kinds of linguistic representation. These 
kinds  are  individuated,  roughly,  by  the  systems  of  representation  that  govern  them 
(Greenberg 2013). In some pictorial systems, there are clearly means by which colors can 
be  represented  in  isolation.  Imagine  a  sort  of  ‘Lagadonian’  system  of  pictorial 
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representation with one rule: each color pictorially represents itself. This appears to be a 
system of pictorial representation in which colors can be representationally isolated. So if 
RPI intends to achieve explanation by subsumption, it needs to be more specific about the 
kind of pictorial representation we have in view. 
But as I said, this is a quibble. I suspect that the idea is that ‘ordinary’ pictorial 
representation does not allow for the representation of color without the representation 
space. Let us call this species of pictorial representation depiction. The idea, then, is that 
we explain the limits of phenomenal representation in terms of the limits of depiction––
its limits are subsumed by the limits of depiction. 
The problem is that, once we get clear about what the idea is, a circularity worry 
looms large. I think that Tim Crane puts his finger on the source of the problem when he 
says  that  it’s  not  that  “visual  perception  is  essentially  pictorial;...rather...picturing  is 
essentially visual” (2009: 462). The thought seems rather intuitive: what is depicted is 
how things look  from a given viewpoint. How things look from a given viewpoint, if 
intentionalism is true, is given by the properties phenomenally represented by a normal 
subject’s  visual  experience  from  that  viewpoint.  I  agree  with  the  objector  that  this 
connection  is  explanatory,  not  coincidental.  But  I  think  they’ve  got  the  order  of 
explanation wrong. Part of what explains the fact that x depicts something as having a 
property F is that, were x to be viewed by a subject under normal conditions, it would 
cause that subject to have an experience that phenomenally represents F. But this means if 
we were to explain the limits  of  phenomenal representation in terms of the limits  of 
depiction, our explanation would be circular. In fact, it would just be mistaken. Depiction 
has the limits it does because it is a sort of quasi-phenomenal representation. Not the 
other way around. 
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In fact, philosophers of art often strive for exactly this kind of explanation. Dominic 
Gregory (2010)  develops  a  metasemantics  of  depiction that  tries  to  do justice  to  the 
following, intuitive idea: “Pictures show how things look from viewpoints; and what a 
picture  depicts  derives  from how it  shows things  as  looking”  (20).  On this  account, 
roughly, “things that are involved in…phenomenological contents…will be what settles 
the picture’s depictive properties” (ibid). Gregory goes on to show how this account can 
serve to explain certain representational limits of depiction by deriving them from the 
representational limits of experience. One claim he focuses on is:
there are many properties F which are such that, if a picture depicts some 
item as  being F,  the picture  must  depict  the item as  being some more 
specific variety of F. (ibid: 26)
He uses the property of being a triangle to illustrate. If a picture depicts something as 
being a triangle, then it must depict it as being some specific sort of triangle. He notes 
that the same seems to hold for experience, writing that: “we never just seem to see ‘a 
triangle’.  Rather,  anyone to whom things look thus,  and who thereby seems to see a 
triangle, will be someone who seems to see a particular sort of triangle” (ibid). Given his 
metasemantics  of  depiction,  the  limits  of  depiction  are  therefore  inherited  from  the 
representational limits of experience.
3.4.5 PHENOMENAL REPRESENTATION IS STRUCTURED
Objection. You’ve misunderstood the previous objection. Set questions about explanatory 
priority  to  one  side.  The  crucial  point  is  this.  States  that  phenomenally  represent 
properties are not simple, atomic states. Rather, they are structured in a distinctive way. 
Moreover,  their  structure (1)  is  something like the structure of  a  picture and (2)  this 
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structure  prevents  them from phenomenally  representing  color  without  phenomenally 
representing space. 
One  way  of  thinking  about  this  is  to  invoke  what  philosophers  and  cognitive 
scientists sometimes call feature maps. The relevant sort of feature map may be thought 
of as a:
very large matrix drawn on a sheet of paper, some of whose cells contain 
written symbols.  The symbols  represent  at  least  some of  the following 
local features: presence of a tiny patch of surface, orientation of the patch 
of surface, determinate shade of color, texture, and so on. (Tye, 1995: 261)
We might say that states phenomenally represent as follows: symbols in the cells of the 
matrix  achieve  their  representational  properties  in  a  standard,  reductive 
representationalist fashion. For example, whether a given symbol represents this or that 
color is fixed by the biological function of that symbol type within the subject that tokens 
the symbol.  However,  whether the state itself  phenomenally represents  certain spatial 
properties is a function of the representational properties and location of the symbols in 
the matrix. So, to give a toy example, if a state S has symbols x and y located in adjacent 
cells A1 and B1, and x and y both represent red, then S phenomenally represents a red 
line at a particular location. 
This  is  not,  however,  a  contingent  feature  of  phenomenal  representation.  It  is 
essential to phenomenal representation––and so necessarily true––that it is realized in a 
feature map format. In other words, states that are not feature maps cannot phenomenally 
represent. But states that are feature maps and that represent at all must represent spatial 
properties.  Hence,  we  get  the  necessary  connection  between  the  phenomenal 
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representation  of  color  and  the  phenomenal  representation  of  space.  So  reductive 
intentionalism is saved. 
Reply. It is, I think, far from obvious that it is essential to phenomenal representation 
that it be realized any particular representational format. Why couldn’t it be that there are 
creatures who have states that phenomenally represent but these states lack a feature map 
structure? However, I’ll set this aside. I think there is a far more striking consequence of 
the feature map proposal. 
One of the attractive features of reductive intentionalism is that,  standardly,  it  is 
externalist. It allows us to explain the character of our experiences by appealing to the 
character of the world. Color experiences, for example, inherit their phenomenology from 
the colors of the objects that (roughly) typically cause them. However, on the feature map 
proposal, this is false  of spatial properties. The spatial properties that our experiences 
phenomenally represent will be determined, almost entirely, by the structure of the states 
themselves. Recall the toy example above where state S has symbols x and y located in 
adjacent cells A1 and B1, and x and y both represent red. Once we fix the representational 
properties  of  these  symbols,  the  feature  map  structure  of  S  does  the  rest  of  the 
representation-fixing  work.  Purely  because  x  and  y  are  located  in  adjacent  cells,  S 
phenomenally represents a red line at a particular location. S does not inherit its spatial 
character from the world at all. Instead, it inherits it from the feature map structure of S 
itself. This strikes me as somewhat bizarre. On this view, while the character of color 
phenomenology is inherited from the world, the character of spatial phenomenology is 
not. (If anything, it seems that things should go the other way around.) Perhaps this is a 
way  of  saving  reductive  intentionalism.  But  it  comes  at  a  cost  that,  I  suspect,  few 
reductive intentionalists would be willing to pay.
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Let me conclude my response to objections by making a general point. Even if there 
is a way of undermining the case of the Treeple––indeed, even if I am wrong about the 
necessary  connection  between  color  and  space––teleo-intentionalism  still  faces  a 
problem.  For  it  allows  for  representational  decoupling  of  virtually  any  pair  of 
properties––including pitch properties and volume properties as well as motion properties 
and temporal properties. Suppose, for example, that the pitch C#6 is deadly to a certain 
species at any volume. As a result, members of this species came to have a perceptual 
system whose biological function is to indicate instantiations of pitch properties. But such 
a system clearly need not have the function of indicating volume properties at all––the 
system wouldn’t need to ‘tell’ members of the species how loud the pitch is. It is only the 
pitch that is a threat to these creatures’ survival. Volume is irrelevant. From here, it is 
easy to  construct  a  case where teleo-intentionalism predicts  that  there  is  phenomenal 
representation of pitch but not volume. Yet, as I have argued, representational isolation of 
this sort is impossible where phenomenal representation is concerned. This should lead us 
to reject––or at least heavily revise––teleo-intentionalism.
3.5 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. I have argued that phenomenal representation has peculiar limits and 
that,  when  we  have  these  limits  in  view,  reductive  varieties  of  intentionalism  look 
implausible.  In my view, this  isn’t  a  strike against  the prospects  of  intentionalism so 
much as it is a strike against the prospects of reduction. There are good reasons to be an 
intentionalist  that  are  independent  of  the  advantages  it  affords  one  in  constructing  a 
reductive theory of consciousness. 
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I won’t get into the details here. But in light of this, I think we might favor a non-
reductive form of intentionalism:
Non-reductive Intentionalism: Intentionalism is true and phenomenally 
representing a quality is grounded in bearing some physical, functional, or 
computational relation to that quality.
On the face of it, non-reductive intentionalism does not encounter the difficulties of its 
reductive cousin.  At most,  if  having F grounds having G, then having F necessitates 
having  G,  but  not  vice  versa.  So,  in  the  case  of  the  Treeple,  the  non-reductive 
intentionalist––if she goes in for a teleosemantic variety of reductive intentionalism––will 
be committed to saying that Treeple phenomenally represent colors. However, she will 
not be committed to saying that they do not phenomenally represent spatial properties. 
For it doesn’t follow from the fact that they don’t bear the relevant naturalistic relation to 
spatial  properties  that  they  do  not  phenomenally  represent  spatial  properties––for 
phenomenal representation isn’t identical with such a relation on this view. It could very 
well be that the Treeple phenomenally represent spatial properties, but do so in virtue of 
standing in some distinct relation to those properties. Which relation, however, is a tricky 
matter. But this is an issue for another time. 
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